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The Shoe Is About to Drop for the
Platform Economy: Understanding
the Current Worker Classification
Landscape in Preparation for a
Changed World
SAMANTHA J. PRINCE•

Abstract
Whether a worker is an independent contractor or employee is of
great significance in many countries, including the United States. This
label drives whether a worker is entitled to many protections and benefits, including minimum wage, overtime, workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, anti-discrimination protection, NLRA protection, and more. The difficulty inherent in accurately classifying
workers as either independent contractors or employees cannot be
overstated. First, there are so many tests spanning all levels of our
government. Second, there are so many ways that people work,. and
with the increased popularity of app-based work, classification becomes even more difficult. Simply, some of the tests have not been
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working well when applied to precarious app-based work. As a result,
policymakers are forced to finally bring these issues to the forefront.
Worldwide policymakers and leaders are implementing changes
to protect app-based workers. In the United States, the federal government is evaluating whether these changes in the workforce require
changes in national labor and tax laws. While campaigning, President
Biden pledged to establish a uniform worker classification test for purposes ofall federal labor, employment, and tax laws. Subnational governments- states and cities-are also evaluating and making changes
in their policies and laws.
To make these decisions, policymakers will need to be familiar
with the current landscape of tests and statutes. Policymakers should
evaluate the approaches that currently are being used and how they
have fared so that they can decide whether to strike out with a novel
test or adopt one already in use. Although prior articles have considered worker classification laws, and the benefits associated with various classification approaches, things have evolved so quickly that in
some respects most of those articles are at least partially out of date.
And having all of this information in one place is critical for ease in
policymaking research and deliberations.
This Article fills the current knowledge gap by providing an up-Iodate compendium of the current state of worker classification laws.
The Article starts with a segment on instabilities and health issues experienced by app-based workers. Then it covers the latest on worker
classification laws around the world including the EU Commission's
Proposed Directive. It then turns to tests that the US. is using, which
include traditional tests and new tests from both the state and city levels. The Article explains how these tests are used and summarizes commentary about the strengths and weaknesses of each of these tests. As
national, state, and local policymakers consider how best to move forward in regulating the app-based economy and its workers, they are
likely to find the information in this Article useful to their deliberations.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Everybody's talking about it. No matter where you are,
it is the subject of conversations everywhere-the European Union, India, Kenya, Thailand, South Africa,
United Kingdom, to name a few, and at all levels of
government in the United States. "It" is how to provide
protections for workers engaged in app-based/platform
work.

When we shop for clothing, what do we look for? Many of us
seek out clothing that is ethically made-produced in a way that is responsible toward people, animals, and the environment. If a product is
ethically made, the workers who made the clothing were treated
fairly-fair wage, safe working conditions, etc. We spend quite a bit
of time trying to find companies that source products that were made
ethically. And we are fine with paying more for such products because
we want the workers who made them to be able to afford food for their
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families and have a good life. 1 Yet when we need a ride or want a food
delivery, why are we ok with grabbing our phone, opening that app,
and ordering without concern over whether the drivers are fairly treated
by the companies they work for or protected by governmental regulation?
Like other workers, how that driver is classified is a key determinant of whether they receive employment related benefits and protections. 2 The Ninth Circuit recognized:
[W]hether an individual performing services for another
is an employee or an independent contractor is an all-ornothing proposition. If [a Grubhub driver] is an employee, he has rights to minimum wage, overtime, expense reimbursement and workers compensation benefits. Ifhe is not, he gets none. With the advent of the gig
economy, and the creation of a low wage workforce performing low skill but highly flexible episodic jobs, the
legislature may want to address this stark dichotomy. In
the meantime the Court must answer the question one
way or the other. 3
Historically, app-based platform workers have not been protected by employment and labor laws because app-based companies
have long touted that their workers are independent contractors, end
users of their software, or customers. 4 However, that storyline has not

1.
Laura, Why I Buy Ethically Made, FAIRLY S. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://fairlysouthem.com/why-i-buy-ethically-made ("I choose to buy ethically made products
because I want the producers of my products to be able to afford food for themselves
and their families. I want them to have pleasant and safe work environments just like
I would want for myself. I want them to be paid decently, just as I would want any of
my own family members or friends to be paid decently. I want the producers of my
belongings and my food to be treated with dignity and respect.").
2.
The author recognizes that worker classification is used for a variety of
purposes and in this article discusses the topic generally for employment law related
purposes unless otherwise stated more specifically, for example to address solely minimum wage.
3.
Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2018),
a.ffdin part, vacated in part, 13 F .4th 908 (9th Cir. 2021 ).
4.
O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137-38 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (outlining Uber's argument that drivers are independent contractors); Cotter v.
Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (outlining Lyft's arguments
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aged well, and times are changing. App-based companies are being
called to the carpet for not providing worker protections, and not just
in the United States. 5 For instance, in Spain, food delivery drivers are
against employee status). Uber's public SEC filings refer to drivers as independent
contractors. Uber Announces Results for Second Quarter 2021, UBER INV. (Aug. 4,
2021 ), https://investor.uber.com/news-events/news/press-release-details/2021/UberAnnounces-Results-for-Second-Quarter-202 l; see ALEX RosENBLAT, UBERLAND:
How ALGORITHMS ARE REWRITING THE RULES OF WORK 157 (2018) (commenting
that Uber refers to drivers as "end users" of its software rather than workers).
The term "end users" distances drivers from being classified as employees
protection by employment and labor laws. RosENBLAT supra; see
receiving
from
and
also Letter from Lisa Stimmell, Att'y, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C., to
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfnoaction/14a-8/2021/nyscrlyft02052l-l4a8-incoming.pdf. Lyft has referred to its
drivers as "customers" in its explanation to the SEC as to why it was not going to
include in its Proxy Statement a shareholder proposal submitted by the New York
State Common Retirement Fund asking that the Board of Directors prepare a report
comparing the compensation and benefits of executives to Lyft's workforce including
drivers. Stimmell supra, at 4.
See Jason Moyer-Lee & Nicola Kountouris, The "Gig Economy": Litigat5.
ing the Cause of Labour, in TAKEN FOR A RIDE: LITIGATING THE DIGITAL PLATFORM
MODEL 6, 7-8 (2021) ("Uber alone has had various aspects of its business model impugned before the apex courts oflndia, Brazil, the UK, the EU, Canada, and [several
U.S. states] ....") (citations omitted); Tham Yuen-C, Advisory Committee on Gig
Workers Does Not Rule Out Laws to Protect Workers, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 15, 2021)
(reporting on a committee created by Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong
to focus on providing gig workers protections with the expectation that a solution will
be reached by the second half of 2022); Swiss Court Confirms Uber Status as 'Employer', SWISSINFO.CH (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-courtconfirms-uber-status-as-employer-/46036976. In Chile, Judge Angela Hernandez
Guierrez found that a delivery driver was an employee. See INT'L LAWS. ASSISTING
WORKERS NETWORK, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: LIT IGA TING THE DIGIT AL PLATFORM MODEL
51 (2021) (providing a summary of Judge Hernandez Guierrez's decision in Alvaro
Felipe Arredondo Montoya and Pedidos Ya Chile SPA). In India, "gig workers" are
now provided Social Security benefits but not yet protected by minimum wages or
allowed collective bargaining. Sanaya Sinha, Gig Workers' Access to Social Security
in India, ACCOUNTABILITY INDIA (May 31, 2021 ), https://accountabilityindia.in/blog/gig-workers-access-to-social-security-in-india. However, on September 20, 2021, the Indian Federatio of App-based Transport Workers filed a "public
interest litigation" on behalf of app-based workers with the Supreme Court of India
seeking more protections. Haritima Kavia, The Gig Is Up: International Jurisprudence and the Looming Supreme Court Decision for Indian Gig Workers, THE
LEAFLET (Oct. 5, 2021 ), https://www.theleaflet.in/the-gig-is-up-international-jurisprudence-and-the-looming-supreme-court-decision-for-indian-gig-workers. Portugal
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now considered employees entitled to a host of benefits. 6 Additionally,
Uber lost a legal battle in the United Kingdom, and now ride-share
drivers there must be treated as workers with entitlement to minimum
wage (National Living Wage), holiday pay, and participation in pension benefits. 7 Formerly they were treated as independent contractors
with no entitlements. And in the Netherlands, Uber and Deliveroo drivers won court cases entitling them to be treated as employees receiving
wage protections. 8
Governments are not the only entities scrutinizing app-based
companies. For example, Aviva Investors, one of the UK's largest
is also tackling the app-based economy. The government approved a bill that requires
platforms, such as Uber and Glovo, to employ some drivers as "staff' with benefits
and formal employment contracts. This would correlate with classifying them as "employees" in other countries. See Sergio Goncalves & Catarina Demony, Portugal's
Gig-Economy Workers Set to Become Staff, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/portugals-gig-economy-workers-set-becomestaff-2021-l 0-22. But see cases in New Zealand and Australia holding app-based
drivers were independent contractors. INT'L LAWS. ASSISTING WORKERS NETWORK,
supra, at 62 (providing a summary of the Employment Court of New Zealand's decision in Atapattu Arachchige v. Rasier New Zealand Ltd. & Uber B. V); id. at 39
(providing a summary of Australia's Fair Work Commission in Gupta v. Portier Pacific Pty. Ltd.). Additionally, in Brazil the high court held that there was no employment relationship between Uber and its drivers, overruling the lower court's finding.
See id. at 46 (providing a summary of Brazil's Superior Labour Court's decision in
Marcia Vieira Jacob v. Uber do Brasil Tecnologia Ltda. ).
6.
See infra Part III.B.
7.
See INT'L LAWS. ASSISTING WORKERS NETWORK, supra note 5, at 72 (proving a summary of the UK's Supreme Court's decision in Uber BV v. Aslam). The
worker category lies between independent contractors and employees. See also infra
Part III.C; Uber v. United Trade Action Grp., Ltd. [2021] EWHC (Admin) 3290 (holding that London taxi-hailing apps cannot offload their legal obligations on gig economy drivers).
8.
Anthony Deutsch & Toby Sterling, Uber Drivers Are Employees, Not Contractors, Says Dutch Court, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-court-rules-uber-drivers-are-employees-not-contractors-newspaper-2021-09-13 (reporting on the ruling that Uber drivers are employees
and therefore entitled to workers' rights under Dutch labor laws). Netherlands-Court
of Appeals Rules Deliveroo Couriers are Employees, Not Self-Employed, STAFFING
INDus. ANALYSTS (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www2.staffingindustry.com/eng/Editorial/Daily-N ews/Netherlands-Court-of-Appeals-rules-Deliveroo-couriers-are-employees-not-self-employed-56714. Deliveroo drivers must be paid a fixed hourly
wage, allowances, and holiday pay. In addition, they must be paid wages while they
wait.
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asset managers said that it would not invest in Deliveroo because its
riders/drivers were not guaranteed minimum wage, sick leave, and holiday pay. 9 And Fairwork-a group that evaluates and ranks digital
platforms based on a variety of"fair work" principles-scrutinizes and
raises awareness by utilizing globally diverse researchers to rank appbased companies based on fair pay, fair conditions, fair contracts, fair
management, and fair representation. 10 Sometimes the workers themselves speak out. In New York City, food delivery workers were reg11
ularly attacked while riding their bikes home after their shifts. As a
result of the attacks, which often included serious injury and bike thefts,
city delivery workers protested and lobbied with nonprofits in favor of
protective legislation. 12 In China, an app-based platform food delivery
driver doused himself in gasoline and set himself on fire. 13 The video
went viral and brought awareness that China's delivery drivers, at that
time, did not receive adequate protections. 14
Jem Bartholomew, "In My Dreams I'm Still Doing the Deliveries": Inside
9.
the Battle Against the Gig Economy, PROSPECT MAG. (July 15, 2021),
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/essays/deliveroo-gig-economy-unions-strikeemployees-share-price-ipo.
Fairwork is a project based at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of
10.
Oxford. Principles, FAIRWORK, https://fair.work/en/fw/principles (last visited Apr. 2,
2022).
Josh Dzieza, Revolt of the Delivery Workers, CURBED (Sept. 13, 2021),
11.
https://www.curbed.com/article/nyc-delivery-workers.html.
Id. Protective legislation was quickly passed. See infra note 21; Jeffery C.
12.
Mays, New York Passes Sweeping Bills to Improve Conditions for Delivery Workers,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/23/nyregion/nycfood-delivery-workers.html.
Alice Su, Why a Takeout Deliveryman in China Set Himself on Fire, L.A.
13.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021, 11:59 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/202102-08/why-takeout-delivery-man-china-set-himself-on-fire. The delivery driver's
current agency withheld wages when the delivery driver attempted to switch working
for his current app-based platform to another platform. Because the agency refused
to pay him his wages, the driver set himself on fire. Id.; see also Zen Soo, Deaths,
Self-immolation Draw Scrutiny on China Tech Giants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 17,
2021 ), https ://apnews.com/article/technology-hong-kong-coronavirus-pandemic-ecommerce-fires-f4cd68ecf97 l 26322934 3ab49f5 f440d.
Su, supra note 13. China is making moves to protect app-based workers.
14.
In July 2021, the China State Administration for Market Regulation required appbased companies to provide certain benefits to the drivers/riders. Josh Ye, China's
Top Court Wants to Protect Gig Workers Without Hampering Tech Platforms' Development, Aiding Meituan and Didi, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 24, 2021, 2:00
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App-based service companies have existed for over ten years
now, and U.S. courts have classified app-based workers as early as
2015. 16 Classifying workers, particularly those working for app-based
companies, remains a challenge for all levels of our government. 17
Subnational policymakers have been moving the issue of app-based
worker classification to the forefront, albeit in different ways. Tennessee and a handful of other states passed "marketplace contractor laws"
in 2018. 18 California notably passed its "gig" worker classification
15

PM),
https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3149932/chinas-top-court-wantsprotect-gig-workers-without-hampering-tech. In September, China's Supreme People's Court announced that it was going to "strike a balance between protecting gig
works and ensuring the country's internet platforms can continue to develop and offer
flexible employment." Id. From this it is postulated that the Court will create a third
category of worker that will be entitled to certain benefits but not as many as employees. Id.
15.
Uber was founded in 2009 and went live in San Francisco in May 2010.
See Ellen Huet, Uber's Global Expansion in Five Seconds, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2014,
6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/11/ubers-global-expansion. Lyft went live in San Francisco in 2012. Ryan Lawler, With a San Francisco
Launch Imminent, Lyft Is Doubling Its Fleet ofDrivers and Readying an Android App,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 25, 2012, 5:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2012/08/25/lyft-sanfrancisco-launch.
16.
Sam Sanders, California Labor Commission Rules Uber Driver Is an Employee, Not a Contractor, NPR (June 17, 2015, 4:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/17/415262801/califomia-labor-commission-rules-uberdriver-is-an-employee-not-a-contractor.
17.
See Zane Muller, Algorithmic Harms to Workers in the Platform Economy:
The Case of Uber, 53 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 167, 197 (2020) ("There is widespread agreement that the existing worker classification scheme is poorly suited to
work relationships in the platform economy."); see also Thomas W. Joo & Leticia
Saucedo, A New Paradigm: Rideshare Drivers, Collective Labor Action, and Antitrust, 69 BUFF. L. REv. 805, 815 (2021) (discussing the difficulty in determining employee status because each employment and labor law statute-such as the NLRArequires close examination). Professors Joo & Saucedo comment on the fact that none
of the current tests are "outcome determinative" but rather require courts to make factdeterminative inquiries with every case. Joo & Saucedo, supra; see also, e.g., Ruth
Berins Collier, V.B. Dubai, & Christopher Carter, Labor Platforms and Gig Work:
The Failure to Regulate 2 (Inst. for Rsch. on Lab. and Emp., IRLE Working Paper
No. 106-17, 2017) (analyzing regulatory issues for app-based workers, using Uber as
an example). Professor Dubai and her colleagues' analysis includes a look into the
major regulatory disputes over worker classification. Id.
18.
See ilifra Part V.D.l.

2022

The Shoe Is About to Drop

635

law, AB5, in September 2019. 19 In 2018 and 2020 respectively, New
York City and Seattle passed ordinances providing for minimum wage
for app-based ride-share drivers. 20 And in the fall of 2021, New York
City became the first city in the United States to pass a legislative pack21
age designed to protect delivery drivers and riders.
The United States federal government has lagged behind, but it
looks like the shoe is about to drop. 22 U.S. Labor Secretary Marty
Assemb. B. 5, Ch. 296, § 2 (Cal. 2019). The bill, which took effect January
19.
1, 2020, added CAL. LAB. CODE§ 2750.3. See also infra Part V.B.
N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 19-549 (effective Aug. 14, 2018); Seattle, Wash.,
20.
Ordinance 126189 (Jan. 1, 2021). Putting into context the N.Y.C. rule: "The New
York pay rules would apply to four major car service apps-Uber, Lyft, Via and
Juno-all of which provide more than 10,000 trips each day in New York." Emma
G. Fitzsimmons & Noam Scheiber, New York City Considers New Pay Rules for Uber
Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/nyregion/uber-drivers-pay-nyc.htrnl. On June 25, 2021, an ordinance was introduced in
Chicago that would require a minimum pay rate similar to ordinances in New York
and Seattle. A.D. Quig, Chicago Could Be Next Big City to Set Minimum Pay Rate
for Uber and Lyfl Drivers, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus. (June 25, 2021, 2:05 PM),
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/transportation/chicago-could-be-next-big-city-setminimum-pay-rate-uber-and-lyft-drivers.
The package provides delivery workers minimum wage and numerous
21.
other protections by: "prevent[ing] the food delivery apps and courier services from
charging workers fees to receive their pay; mak[ing] the apps disclose their gratuity
policies; prohibit[ing] the apps from charging delivery workers for insulated food
bags, which can cost up to $50; and requir[ing] restaurant owners to make bathrooms
available to delivery workers." Jeffery C. Mays, New York Passes Sweeping Bills to
Improve Conditions for Delivery Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/23/nyregion/nyc-food-delivery-workers.html.
Lack of access to restrooms has been an issue for app-based workers, particularly in
cities. Id. Drivers will still be considered independent contractors otherwise. Id.
See generally Jon 0. Shimabukuro, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46765, Worker
22.
Classification: Employee Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the ABC Test (2021) (describing a report covering select
worker classification tests prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service). See also The Atlanta Opera, Inc., 371 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (2021) (where the Board
majority, composed of Chairman Mcferran and Members Prouty and Wilcox, seek
comments on whether the NLRB should adhere to the independent contractor standard
in SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (2019), and if not, what standard
should replace it--e.g., should the Board return to the standard in FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610 (2014), either in its entirety or with modifications?). Members
Kaplan and Ring, however, wrote a dissenting opinion contending that the Board's
reexamination of its recent precedent is inappropriate. Id. And the Federal Trade
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Walsh told Reuters, "in a lot of cases gig workers should be classified
as employees . . . in some cases they are treated respectfully and in
some cases they are not and I think it has to be consistent across the
board ... .'m And President Biden campaigned to "[ e ]nsure workers
in the 'gig economy' ... receive the legal benefits and protections they
deserve." 24 To move things forward, the Biden administration increased funding for the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of

Commission (FTC) warned gig companies that they could be fined for misleading
prospective workers about how much they can earn on app-based platforms. Lois
Greisman, Associate Director of Marketing Practices at the FTC, stated that the gig
economy is "an area of serious concern" when it concerns wage transparency. Levi
Sumagaysay, From Treatment of Gig Workers to Tip Transparency, the App-Based
Economy Could See Key Changes in 2022, MarketWatch (Jan. l, 2022, 12:23 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/from-treatment-of-gig-workers-to-tip-transparency-the-app-based-economy-could-see-key-changes-in-2022-1 l640900832.
23.
Nandita Bose, Exclusive: U.S. Labor Secretary Supports Classifying Gig
Workers as Employees, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2021, 10:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-us-labor-secretary-says-most-gig-workers-should-beclassified-2021-04-29; see also Josh Eidelson, Biden's Top Labor Lawyer Will Use
Her Whole Eriforcement Arsenal, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2021, 3:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202 l-12- l 4/biden-labor-lawyerjennifer-abruzzo-to-fully-use-nlrb-power-to-protect-workers. NLRB 's general counsel, Jennifer Abruzzo, spoke with Bloomberg Businessweek in December 2021 and
was asked whether her view on employee status is affected if a company says that its
dispatched gig workers are contractors. Id She responded, "There's plenty of workers in the gig economy that I think are misclassified as independent contractors. It's
not like all or none. Every case is fact-specific." Id
24.
The Eiden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers (last visited
Apr. 2, 2022); see also Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar.
31,
2021 ),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/3 l/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan.

2022

The Shoe Is About to Drop

637

Labor-the unit that handles worker classification issues. 25 The NLRB
26
is also hoping to receive more funding to address misclassification.
The uncertainty and volume of lawsuits created by this one issue-worker classification-is not efficient or sustainable and certainly not ideal. 27 Boosting enforcement is necessary, but it would be
even better if we did not have to allocate so many resources to this issue
and if workers and companies did not have to be burdened by so many
lawsuits. To get a small glimpse of the volume of app-based worker
classification suits in California alone, we can look to Lyft's Form 10Q filed on May 8, 2020:

OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL
25.
YEAR 2022, at 15 (2021) ("The Budget provides increased funding to the worker protection agencies in the Department of Labor to ensure workers are treated with dignity
and respect in the workplace. The Administration is also committed to ending the
abusive practice of misclassifying employees as independent contractors, which deprives these workers of critical protections and benefits. ln addition to including funding in the Budget for stronger enforcement, the Administration intends to work with
the Congress to develop comprehensive legislation to strengthen and extend protections against misclassification across appropriate Federal statutes.").
On September 8, 2021, the House Education and Labor Committee sub26.
mitted a new bill as part of a Democrat-led budget reconciliation package. H. EDUC.
& LAB. COMM., 117TH CONG., AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO
COMMITTEE PRINT 115 (Comm. Print 2021) (offered by Congressman Bobby Scott),
https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/ANS%20to%20the%20Committee%20Print%20Offered%20by%20Mr. %20
Scott.pdf. The bill provides for funds to increase enforcement for several agencies
including $350,000,000 for the NLRB "for carrying out activities of the board." Id.;
see also Nandita Bose, U.S. Labor Board Prosecutor Hopes to Bulk Up Staffing,
Budget as Gig Worker Scrutiny Grows, REUTERS (June 24, 2021, 4:03 PM),
https://www .reuters.com/legal/transactional/us-labor-board-prosecutor-hopes-bulkup-staffing-budget-gig-worker-scrutiny-2021-06-24.
For example, two class action cases were filed in the Southern District of
27.
New York simultaneously against Lyft and Instacart alleging that workers were misclassified under New York law. See Class Action Complaint, Chandra v. Lyft, Inc.,
No. 1:21-cv-07113 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2021); Class Action Complaint, Chambers v.
Maplebear, Inc., No. l:21-cv-07114 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2021). Until we have definitive (reliable) guidance on how to classify app-based workers, large numbers oflawsuits-some repetitive-will continue to be brought. The same goes for arbitrations.
See Richard Reibstein, Deja Vu in the Independent Contractor Misclassification
Arena: August 2021 News Update, JDSUPRA (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/deja-vu-in-the-independent-contractor-5497740.
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The Company is currently involved in a number of putative class actions, thousands of individual claims, including those brought in arbitration or compelled pursuant to
our Terms of Service to arbitration, matters brought, in
whole or in part, as representative actions under California's Private Attorney General Act, Labor Code Section
2698, et seq., alleging that the Company misclassified
drivers as independent contractors and other matters
challenging the classification of drivers on the Company's platform as independent contractors. 28
Worker classification for app-based workers needs to be clarified now. Some policymakers are seeking new ideas; some are hanging
onto the old. Some are free-riding on tests used by others, and some
are customizing others' laws seeking to improve upon them. 29 Regardless of the way the federal or subnational government policymakers
choose to proceed, knowing what tests are being used, and what other
countries are doing will be instrumental in reaching an optimal solution
to classifying app-based workers. It is not enough to imitate or blindly
adopt what appears to be trending a t the state level (e.g., the ABC
test or the IRS twenty-factor test). 30
As policymakers forge ahead, it is important they be familiar
with the options that exist currently and what is going on internationally. During such exploration, policymakers may find portions of current tests sufficiently applicable to app-based workers. Then again
some may find that classifying such workers under the historical tests

28. Lyft, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 24 (May 8, 2020)(emphasis
added).
29.
To customize its adoption of the ABC test, California policymakers created 109 exemptions that would be tested under their old test. See Samantha J. Prince,
The AB5 Experiment- Should States Adopt California's Worker Classification Law?,
11 AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 43 (2022).
It is interesting to note that in an April 2021 report generated by the Con30.
gressional Research Service, the author only reported on the control test, the economic
realities test, and the ABC test. The report does not cover other tests such as the IRS
twenty-factor test, which raises the question, why is Congress only considering the
ABC test as an alternative to the traditionally used worker classification tests? Presumably the answer lies with the PRO Act's passing in the House in March 2021.
However, the research should go beyond a discussion of the ABC test, which is part
of the reason for this article. See Shimabukuro, supra note 22.
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is like "fitting a square peg into a round hole. " 31 It is difficult to classify
app-based workers under the traditional employment law factor-based
tests-the control test and economic realities test. 32 On the one hand,
such workers are akin to independent contractors in that they have the
freedom to choose when to work. On the other hand, app-based workers are doing work for the app companies that is instrumental to their
core business, and the businesses have significant control over the
workers. 33
In the classic sense, independent contractors possess a
skill outside the core competencies of the hiring company
that is needed only for a limited purpose and duration.
Independent contractors have traditionally provided occasional skills tangential to the hiring party's business.
But businesses have found hiring independent contractors to be economically advantageous even when the
workers' skills are directly related to the hiring company's core competencies and are needed not only continuously, but also required for the business to exist. 34

Cotterv. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Robert
31.
Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Trying to Fit Square
Pegs in Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53, 60 (2015).
And, actually, at least two scholars believe we should not try to correct this
32.
issue via employment laws. See Martin H. Malin, Protecting Platform Workers in the
Gig Economy: Look to the FTC, 51 IND. L. REv. 377, 383-84 (2018)(proffering that
addressing the app-based worker to platform company relationship as a franchisee to
franchisor relationship will be more effective than seeking to classify through employment laws); see also Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee
When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
295, 302 (2001 ).
33. Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor
Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The "Independent Worker", THE HAMILTON
PROJECT 10 (Dec. 2015), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/ assets/files/modemizing_labor_laws _for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_ harris.pdf. Gig work in
many instances can fall into the gray area between employee and independent contractor relationships. One example is the immeasurability of work hours. Consider
the Uber or Lyft driver who has both apps open on their phone while at home doing
laundry. They decide when they want to pick up a rider but "[d]etermining whether
and for whom an independent worker is 'working' is impossible or deeply problematic
in too many circumstances for the concept of work hours to translate into these emerging relationships." Id. at 13.
34. Sprague, supra note 31, at 71.
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For example, without drivers, Uber could not operate. Is it appropriate to allow Uber to offload risk and responsibilities by classifying drivers as independent contractors? Many courts say "no" even
under the current tests. 35 But the current tests do not provide consistent
results.
This article provides an up-to-date review of the tests being used
at various levels in the United States as well as movement in other
countries with a goal toward providing more information for policymakers. Part II lays out the economic and existential instabilities as
well as the health issues that app-based workers (particularly drivers)
experience. These concerns should motivate policymakers to prioritize
protecting app-based workers. Then, Part III presents an up-to-date
review of app-based worker classification in select countries. While
the textual focus is on several European countries, countries representing each continent are discussed throughout this article in footnotes.
Next, Part IV provides a compilation of the current United States tests
used by the federal government to determine a worker's classification
and provides the scope of each test. Part V then progresses with an upto-date discussion on which worker classification tests are trending at
the state level, such as the ABC test, California's AB5, the IRS twentyfactor test, and Marketplace Contractor statutes. It contains critiques
and commentary regarding the different tests employed. Part VI concludes with a call to action encouraging policymakers to move swiftly
but smartly.
II. HEALTH EFFECTS STEMMING FROM THE ECONOMIC & EXISTENTIAL

35. See, e.g., People v. Uber Techs., Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 266, 298 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2020) as modified on denial ofreh 'g (Nov. 20, 2020); O'Connor v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("Even more fundamentally, it is
obvious drivers perform a service for Uber because Uber simply would not be a viable
business entity without its drivers."); Colin v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CFC-18-567463,
2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1752 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2019). The Supreme Court
of New York State held that there is substantial evidence that Uber can exercise sufficient control over its drivers to establish an employment relationship. See Razak v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2016 WL 5874822, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016)
(finding that the control test weighed heavily in favor of independent contractor status
and upheld UberBlack drivers' self-employed workers classification). The Third Circuit remanded for further proceedings as it contemplated whether drivers were subject
to control under the FLSA. Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2020).
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INSTABILITIES OF APP-BASED WORK

"The gig job is a platform-based evolution of the piece
paid' job of the '80 's, likewise transferring employers'
economic risk-taking and responsibilities to individuals
without a real reciprocal potential for gains in the form
of increased pay or job security." 36
App-based, platform, or gig work exists on every inhabited continent. It doesn't matter what you call it: gig work, platform work,
37
app-based work, or shared work, it is all pretty much the same. And
even though the company names differ, they share the same general
model, which is to say they run their businesses through an app with
38
little or no face-to-face interaction with their workers or customers.

36. Anna Freni-Sterrantino & Vincenzo Salemo, A Plea for the Need to Investigate the Health Effects of Gig-Economy, FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/l 0.33 89/fpubh.2021.638767 /full.
37. Although the term "gig" has a broader meaning than app-based or platform
work, this article will use the term "app-based" primarily to deliberately focus on work
that emanates from the use of an app or platform. Some commentators also use the
term "sharing economy." See Elizabeth Tippett, Using Contract Terms to Detect Underlying Litigation Risk: An Initial Proof of Concept, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 549
(2016). Professor Tippett divides app-based companies into different categories based
on what they are sharing: property-sharing, property-based services, and service sharing.
38. See Muller, supra note 17, at 168 ("[T]echnology firms create app-based
digital marketplaces where buyers and sellers can transact in perfect algorithmic harmony."); see also Veena Dubal, The New Racial Wage Code, HARV. L. &PoL'Y REV.
5 n.13 (May 27, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing the
business model as "one that disseminates assignments through a digital platform, pays
by assignment, and maintains that workers are not legally entitled to employment protections, including the minimum wage, overtime, workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, and the right to collectively organize and bargain").
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Some workers gravitate toward app-based work because they
are free to set their own hours. 39 In that respect, it can be empowering.40 However, app-based work causes existential and economic instability for workers, particularly those who treat the work as their main
source of income. 41
What is evident, from a public health perspective, is
that the flexibility of such jobs goes hand-in-hand with
existential instability (i.e., narrowing other domains of
life, hampering partnering and starting families with
potential for other adversities in individual adult life
course), which is exacerbated among those who rely
entirely on 'gigs' for their income. 42

39. See Monica Anderson, Colleen McClain, Michelle Faverio, & Risa GellesWatnick, The State of Gig Work in 2021, PEW RsCH. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/intemet/202 l /12/08/the-state-of-gig-work-in-2021. In
August, 2021, Pew Research Center surveyed 10,348 U.S. adults on the Center's
American Trends Panel and found 16% of U.S. adults have earned money through an
online gig platform. Of those Americans, 49% reported that "being able to control
their own schedules is a major reason why they have taken on [app-based] jobs over
the past year." Id.; see also Deepa Das Acevedo, Unbundling Freedom in the Sharing
Economy, 91 S. CAL. L. REv. 793, 808 (2018). See generally Liya Palagashvili, Four

Recommendations for Analyzing the Department of Labor's Proposed Rule on Employees vs. Independent Contractors, MERCATUS CTR. (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/department-labor/four-recommendations-analyzing-department-labor's-proposed-rule (arguing women are statistically the predominant caregivers in their families and need work flexibility).
40. See Rina Chandran, Invaluable but Unprotected: Asian Gig Workers Fight
for Rights, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.csmonitor.com/W orld/Asia-Pacific/2021/1004/Invaluable-but-unprotected-Asian-gig-workers-fight-for-rights. Mr. Quah, an economics professor at the National University of
Singapore, is quoted saying, "[f]lexibility doesn't mean unprotected." Id. Singapore
is conducting a study to determine the best way to increase protections for app-based
workers. Id.
41. Freni-Sterrantino & Salemo, supra note 36. See ROSENBLAT, supra note
4, at 52 for a discussion on how workers who try to make a living in ride-share work
take on more risk than part-time drivers who may use this work for supplemental income. See also Fitzsimmons & Scheiber, supra note 20 (pointing to a recent study
that showed "about 40 percent of drivers have incomes so low that they qualify for
Medicaid and about 18 percent qualify for food stamps"); Emma Bartel, Ellen
MacEachen, Emily R. Reid-Musson, & Samantha B. Meyer, Stressfal by Design: Exploring Health Risks ofRide-Share Work, 14 J. TRANSP. & HEALTH 4 (2019) (noting
that after drivers started working for Uber, they found that their net income after expenses was "very low" and that this financial pressure caused stress).
42. Freni-Sterrantino & Salemo, supra note 36.
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Another concern is that many app-based workers work in isolationfor example drivers-and this isolation yields a lack of social support
which in tum also adds to existential instability. 43
In many jurisdictions, there is no established minimum wage for
app-based work, leaving workers with low pay and economic instability.44 But low pay is not the only form of economic instability. Job
insecurity brought forth by algorithms used to rate workers also creates
economic instability. 45 Additionally, not knowing the frequency in
which one will have jobs to generate income not only creates economic
instability but also job strain-"a combination of high demands and
low job control.'"' 6 For instance, an app-based worker turns on the app
43. Molly Tran & Rosemary K. Sokas, The Gig Economy and Contingent
Work: An Occupational Health Assessment, 59 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV'T MED. e63
(2017). See generally Marcia Facey, 'Maintaining Talk' Among Ta.xi Drivers; Accomplishing Health-Protective Behaviour in Precarious Workplaces, 16 HEALTH &
PLACE 1259 (Nov. 2010).
44. See Robert Sprague, Using the ABC Test to Classify Workers: End of the
Platform-Based Business Model or Status Quo Ante?, 11 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv.
733, 738 (2020); AMY KLOBUCHAR, ANTITRUST: TAKING ON MONOPOLY POWER FROM
THE GILDED AGE TO THE DIGIT AL AGE 355 (2021) ("Today's gig economy workersthe people struggling to afford their health-care or educational expenses or working
two or three jobs just to get by-are yesterday's grangers with pitchforks."); SARAH
KESSLER, GIGGED: THE END OF THE JOB AND THE FUTURE OF WORK xiii (2018). See
generally Orly Lobel, We Are All Gig Workers Now: Online Platforms, Freelancers
& the Battles Over Employment Status & Rights During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 57
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 919, 938 (2020) ("[G]ig workers are low-wage laborers with a
small income and large instability."). But see Anderson, McClain, Faverio, & GellesWatnick, supra note 39 (finding that 64% ofrecent or current app-based workers believe the apps or sites have paid them at least somewhat fairly).
45. Bartel, MacEachen, Reid-Musson, & Meyer, supra note 41, at 4-5 (discussing the proposition that ride-share work is "stressful by design" through mediated
ratings and automated navigation and dispatching, and that because drivers can be
removed from the app at any time without any recourse, they experience emotional
stress and anxiety, and quoting a driver as having said ratings are a "major stress factor"); see also Dubai, supra note 38, at 6 (footnote omitted) ("Through the use of
opaque data collection and hidden algorithms, companies personalize wages for each
worker, which allows the companies to practice first degree labor price discrimination.
As a result of this unpredictable and inconsistent wage calculation system, workers
sometimes make no money---or even lose money-after considering vehicle expenses.").
46. Nico Dragano et al., Effort-Reward Imbalance at Work and Incident Coronary Heart Disease: A Multicohort Study of 90,164 lndividuals, 28 EPIDEMIOLOGY
619, 619-20 (2017), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28570388. The authors indicate that job strain can be used to measure work stress. Id. at 620. Job insecurity,
including not knowing the frequency in which one will have jobs, is commonplace
among app-based workers and can induce stress. See id.; see also RosENBLAT, supra
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and waits for a customer, but the worker does not know how quickly a
customer will get lined up, thereby creating an "effort-reward imbalance.'"'7 Job strain and economic instability have been shown to increase risk of heart disease. 48
Researchers have only recently begun gathering data on the
health effects of app-based workers. 49 But some researchers have been
drawing correlations between the negative health effects of taxi drivers
(widely studied) and app-based drivers, 50 and others are seeing patterns
emerging. 51 For example, Dr. Sandra Davidson and colleagues at the
University of Melbourne studied taxi drivers and found high rates of
psychological distress as a result of working conditions such as long
hours, sedentariness, and low pay. 52 In their concluding remarks, they
suggest that high rates of psychological distress would also be found in
app-based ride-share drivers. 53 In addition to psychological distress,
note 4, at 6~5 (describing an online forum where drivers debated about whether to
quit driving for Uber and Lyft full-time). One driver from Los Angeles commented,
"Driving full time is a nice little fantasy, but reality soon slaps you in the face when
you end up living in your car to make ends meet as demand fluctuates . . . . Life on
the road isn't all that great as your health starts taking a toll from all the driving you
do to survive the dirt cheap, rates of $3 to $5 for the average ride." Id.
47. Dragano et al., supra note 46, at 620; see also infra note 241 and accompanying text.
48. Dragano et al., supra note 46, at 620 (explaining that regardless of actual
job strain experienced, individuals with effort-reward imbalance at work have been
shown to have an "increased risk of coronary heart disease").
49. Freni-Sterrantino & Salemo, supra note 36 (noting that researchers only
have a "partial picture of the health effects of the gig economy on workers, as data on
gig jobs are fragmentary and research on health effects has only begun").
50. Bartel, MacEachen, Reid-Musson, & Meyer, supra note 41, at 5. Comparing taxi drivers and ride-sharing drivers in Canada to predict the health and safety risks
that Uber and Lyft drivers encounter, the authors note:
[The] conditions and design of ride-share work are not identical to
the taxi industry: the introduction of an app-based service with
strict app rules made for unique pressures and risks related to mental health for ride-share drivers, including the possibility of lost income for low ratings, high cancellation rates, or low acceptance
rates.
Id.
51. See Freni-Sterrantino & Salemo, supra note 36.
52. Sandra Davidson, Greg Wadley, Nicola Reavley, Jane Gunn, & Susan
Fletcher, Psychological Distress and Unmet Mental Health Needs Among Urban Taxi
Drivers: A Cross-Sectional Survey, 52 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCJTTATRY 473,481 (2018).
53. Id.
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long hours, repetitive motions, and sedentary work engaged in by appbased workers (particularly drivers) also create physical health issues
54
such as back, foot, knee, and leg pain.
Predictably, stress emanating from existential and economic in55
stabilities can lead to other negative health effects as well. In past
research, workers who had constant economic insecurity were shown
to have higher cholesterol and other adverse health issues compared to
economically secure workers. 56 This correlation leads to the inference
that all workers, including app-based workers, who live with economic
insecurity could experience such adverse health outcomes.
Health and economic stakes are high for app-based workers and
therefore for the countries in which they reside. And if this was not
evident before, it is certainly seen now that the COVID-19 pandemic
has increased the use of app-based platforms, particularly food delivery
apps.57
54. Bartel, MacEachen, Reid-Musson, & Meyer, supra note 41, at 3 (noting
that because drivers are paid on a per-ride basis, during peak times, drivers take few
if any breaks). The article also notes that Uber's "surge pricing" provides more pressure to keep driving without taking breaks.
55. See Dragano et al., supra note 46, at 623-24; see also Freni-Sterrantino &
Salerno, supra note 36 (observing that "job-related sources of stress like job demand,
job content, effort-reward imbalance, insecurity, job loss, and unemployment contribute in different and possibly independent ways to well-being").
56. Claire L. Niedzwiedz, Srinivasa Katikireddi, Aaron Reeves, Martin
McKee, & David Stuckler, Economic Insecurity During the Great Recession and Metabolic, Inflammatory and Liver Function Biomarkers: Analysis of the UK Household
Longitudinal Study, 71 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 1005, 1005 (2017) ("Perceived economic insecurity is linked to poor health, including depressive and anxiety
disorders, diabetes and coronary heart disease, as well as hazardous health behaviours
. . . . Indeed, fear of job loss can be just as harmful as, if not more than, the job loss
itself.") (footnotes omitted).
57. See Anthony Derrick, Mayor Durkan Applauds City Council Unanimous
Passage ofHer Fare Share Plan to Guarantee a Fair Minimum Compensation Standard for TNC Drivers, OFF. OF THE MAYOR (Sept. 29, 2020), https://durkan.seattle.gov/2020/09/mayor-durkan-applauds-city-council-unanimous-passage-of-herfare-share-plan-to-guarantee-a-fair-minimum-compensation-standard-for-tnc-drivers
(statement of Mayor Durkan) ("The pandemic has exposed the fault lines in our systems of worker protections, leaving many front line workers like gig workers without
a safety net. It is more important than ever that we add to the economic resilience of
our community of drivers."); see also Chris Taylor, Your Money: Freelancers Have
'Perfect Storm' ofAnxiety Because ofCOVID-19, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2020, 10:41 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavims-freelancers/your-money-freelancers-have-perfect-storm-of-anxiety-because-of-covid-l 9-idUSKBN2l O22K
(statement of Johann Hari) ("[O]f course financial insecurity is going to cause depression and anxiety ....").
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A high percentage of app-based workers, particularly drivers in
major cities, are immigrants and subordinated minorities. 58 And, "if
one removes ridesharing drivers (predominately men) from the calculation, women constitute a larger share of platform economy workers."59 As such these individuals disproportionately feel the brunt of
economic and existential instability and the health issues associated
with app-based work. 60 To protect the app-based working society,
changes need to be made. But for app-based workers to be eligible for
safety net protections such as minimum wage, they must be classified
in a manner that allows such. Numerous countries around the world
rely on worker classification to define eligibility for protections and
benefits like health insurance. The next part highlights what progress
policymakers and courts around the world are making in ensuring protections for their app-based workers.

58. Dubai, supra note 38, at 5--6; Freni-Sterrantino, supra note 36, at 1; see
Anderson, McClain, Faverio, & Gelles-Watnick, supra note 39, at 3 (finding the percentages of adults who have earned money through app-based work are 30% Hispanic,
20% Black, 19% Asian, and 12% White); Levi Sumagaysay, 'Tremendous Potential
Being Wasted': How Gig Work Widens the Racial Wealth Gap -And What Can Be
Done About It, MARKETWATCH (March 27, 2021 9:21 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/tremendous-potential-being-wasted-how-gig-work-widens-theracial-wealth-gap-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-11616777441. The Institution for
the Future (IFTF) screened hundreds of California workers making $15 an hour or less
and found that many of those low-wage workers relied on gig work (with little to no
benefits) as their sole source of income. Sumagaysay, supra. During a conversation
with MarketWatch, Marina Gorbis, Executive Director ofIFTF, stated, "[Because of]
the pandemic and the shutdowns . . . [w]e see polarization of labor and mostly
nonwhite people being greatly affected. It absolutely exacerbates the racial wealth
gap."). Id. See generally Davidson, Wadley, Reavley, Gunn & Fletcher, supra note
52.
59. Prince, supra note 29, at 63.
60. Dubai, supra note 38, at 6--7; Palagashvili, supra note 39, at 2-4; Niels van
Doom, Platform Labor: On the Gendered and Racialized Exploitation ofLow-Income
Service Work in the 'On-Demand' Economy, 20 INFO., COMMC'N & Soc'y 898, 907
(2017) ("It is this legacy that on-demand platforms ... disavow when they rebrand
domestic and institutional service work as a post-racial and gender-neutral opportunity
that combines good pay with a flexible schedule .... [D]espite this influx of white
middle-class workers, the majority of cleaners, janitors, and home care providers operating in the gig economy are working-class men and women of color, especially in
urban areas.") (citations omitted).
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CHANGES ARE HAPPENING AROUND THE WORLD

Courts on all inhabited continents are being tasked with deciding how to classify app-based workers based on current statutes-statutes not created with the app-based economy in mind. 61 These court
holdings often put pressure on policymakers to enact laws. 62 In some
cases, the laws will clarify or codify a court's ruling, and in other cases
they will distinguish it. Policymakers are concerned with ensuring protections for their app-based workers, and even if their own courts are
not deciding cases, they may look to other countries for ideas or momentum. 63

61. See Jaratphong Srirattanan & Seha Yatim, Do Gig Workers Deserve Better
Deal?, BANGKOK POST (Feb. 23, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.bang("The
kokpost.com/opinion/opinion/207 2935/do-gig-workers-deserve-bett er-deal
problem that Thailand and many other countries face is outdated labour laws that do
not adequately embrace (or protect) gig economy workers."); ELLEN MAcEACHEN,
SAMANTHA MEYER, RON SAUNDERS, PHILIP BIGELOW, AGNIESZKA KOSNY, EMILY
REID-MUSSON, EMMA BARTEL, & SHARANYA VARATHAJAN, UNIV. OF WATERLOO,
DRIVING FOR UBER: A DEVELOPMENTAL EVALUATION OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
AND SAFETY CONDITIONS OF RIDE-SHARE WORK 8 (2019) [hereinafter DRIVING FOR
UBER]. Researchers at the University of Waterloo note:
Regulators have struggled to keep pace with the rise of ride-hail
and have developed various forms of ride-hail regulation, often
through municipal licensing, as is the case in Ontario. These regulations are often new, improvised and local regulations, described
as a game of 'whack a mole', [sic] where governments struggle to
contain new enterprises while more pop up.
DRIVING FOR UBER, supra (citing SUNIL JOHAL & NOAH ZoN' POLICYMAKING FOR THE
SHARING ECONOMY: BEYOND WHACK-A-MOLE (2015), https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/ 99326/1/Johal_Zon_2015_Policym aking_for_the_Sharing.pdt); see also Moyer-Lee & Kountouris supra note 5, at 34.
62. For example, Spain's La Ley de! Rider (Rider Law) was enacted due to a
court ruling. See discussion infra Part III.B. Another example is Belgium where the
government initially codified the principles developed by its courts into statutory law
and then went beyond it. See Valerio De Stefano, Ilda Durri, Charalampos Stylogiannis, & Mathias Wouters, Platform Work and the Employment Relationship, at 24
n.94 (Int'! Lab. Org., Working Paper No. 27, 2021); see also Prince supra, note 29, at
54 (discussing a domestic example, where California's legislature codified the court's
ruling in, Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th
903 (2018), into AB5 under pressure to clarify the ruling for businesses and workers).
63. For example, South Africa and Kenya's policymakers are considering laws
inspired by the UK's recent Supreme Court ruling in Uber BV v. Aslam. Uber BV v.
Aslam [2021] UKSC 5 (UK); see also infra Part III.C.
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While this Part cannot cover all countries in the world, 64 it starts
with the moves that the European Union (EU) is making. 65 It then covers Spain, not only because it was an early enactor of legislation that
classified delivery riders as "employees," but also because Spain has a
binary system like the U.S. (workers are either employees or independent contractors). Next, it discusses the United Kingdom, which has a
third category of worker classification and is influential in the United
States as well as other countries, particularly in Africa. Finally, it covers Denmark, where worker classification is negotiated by trade unions rather than through governmental regulation. All have recently
addressed app-based worker classification in their own ways and provide insight into the current changes being made around the world regarding this topic.

A. The European Union Commission's Proposed Directive

EU countries (Member States) have taken varying approaches
to regulating work in the app-based economy, which "has grown almost
fivefold from an estimated €3 billion in 2016 to about €14 billion in
2020."66 "More than 100 court decisions and 15 administrative decisions dealing with the employment status of people working through
platforms have been observed in the Member States, with varying outcomes but predominantly in favour of reclassifying people working
through platforms as workers.''6 7 To address the uncertainty and unfairness behind the variety of approaches, the EU Commission took on

64. See supra note 5; see also the various footnotes throughout this part for
information from other countries.
65. The Member States in the EU are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, M_alta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
66. European Commission Press Release IP/21/2944, Protecting People
Working Through Platforms: Commission Launches Second-Stage Consultation of
Social Partners (June 15, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscomer/detail/en/ip_21 _2944.
67. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Improving Working Conditions in Platform Work, at 8, COM (2021) 762 final
(Dec. 9, 2021) [hereinafter European Commission Proposed Directive], https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docld=24992&langld=en.
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the task of establishing "basic labour standards and rights" for the
growing number of app-based workers across its Member States. 68
After holding two public consultations and performing an impact assessment, the Commission released in late 2021 a proposed directive that sets minimum standards for Member States to meet within
two years after passing of the directive. 69 The proposed directive contains three general objectives focused on improving "working conditions and social rights of people working through platforms, ... [while
supporting] the conditions for the sustainable growth of digital labour
platforms in the [EU]":
( 1) to ensure that people working through platforms have
- or can obtain - the correct employment status in light
of their actual relationship with the digital labour platform and gain access to the applicable labour and social
protection rights;
(2) to ensure fairness, transparency and accountability in
algorithmic management in the platform work context;
and
(3) to enhance transparency, traceability and awareness
of developments in platform work and improve enforcement of the applicable rules for all people working
through platforms, including those operating across borders.70
The first objective, which is the most significant to this article,
was met by creating a framework designed to ensure correct worker
classification of app-based workers. The framework utilizes a rebuttable presumption of an employment arrangement for workers that work
through platforms that "control certain elements of the performance of

68. See id. at 1-3 ("Today, over 28 million people in the EU work through
digital labour platforms. In 2025, their number is expected to have reached 43 million.").
69. Id. at 10.
70. Id. at 3; see also European Commission Press Release IP/21/6605, Commission Proposals to Improve the Working Conditions of People Working Through
Digital Labour Platforms (Dec. 9, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscomer/detail/en/ip_ 21 _ 6605 ("The clear criteria the Commission proposes
will bring the platforms increased legal certainty, reduced litigation costs and it will
facilitate business planning.").
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work." 71 The Commission stated its rationale for use of the presumption:
Those who, as a result of correct determination of their
employment status, will be recognised as workers will
enjoy improved working conditions - including health
and safety, employment protection, statutory or collectively bargained minimum wages and access to training
opportunities - and gain access to social protection according to national rules. Conversely, genuine self-employed people working through platforms will indirectly
benefit from more autonomy and independence, as a result of digital labour platforms adapting their practices to
avoid any risk of reclassification. Digital labour platforms will also gain from increased legal certainty, including with respect to potential court challenges. Other
businesses that compete with digital labour platforms by
operating in the same sector will benefit from a level
playing field as regards the cost of social protection contributions. Member States will enjoy increased revenues
in the form of additional tax and social protection contributions.72
Article 4 of the proposed directive sets forth the legal presumption together with a list of five control factors, two of which must be
met, to trigger the presumption. 73 An app-based company controls the
performance of work if two of the following are met:
(a) effectively determining, or setting upper limits for the
level of remuneration;
(b) requiring the person performing platform work to respect specific binding rules with regard to appearance,
conduct towards the recipient of the service or performance of the work;
(c) supervising the performance of work or verifying the
quality of the results of the work including by electronic
means;
71.
72.
73.

European Commission Proposed Directive, supra note 67, at 3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 34-35.
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(d) effectively restricting the freedom, including through
sanctions, to organise one's work, in particular the discretion to choose one's working hours or periods of absence, to accept or to refuse tasks or to use subcontractors
or substitutes;
(e) effectively restricting the possibility to build a client
base or to perform work for any third party. 74
To clarify, if any two of the above are met, then a worker is
presumed to be an employee or in an employment arrangement with
the app-based company, and therefore the worker will be entitled to the
benefits and social protections that employment brings. The minimum
social protections include transparent and predictable working conditions, minimum requirements for parental and care-giving work-life
balance arrangements, definitions for "working time" and "rest periods," health and safety guarantees, minimum wages, pay transparency,
collective bargaining, unemployment and sickness benefits, participation in old-age pensions, and non-discrimination protection for temporary agency workers (which may apply to certain app-based arrangements).75
The proposed directive creates a baseline or minimum floor of
rights for app-based workers that each Member State has to either meet
or beat to prevent a "race to the bottom in employment practices and
social standards to the detriment ofworkers."76 The next step is for the
European Parliament and the Council to consider the proposed directive. 77 If the directive is passed, then Member States have two years
to comply.

B. Spain's La Ley def Rider
Spain policymakers did not await the results of the EU's public
consultation or the impending proposed directive and on May 11, 2021,
became the first EU country to enact a law that reclassifies app-based

14.
15.
note 70.
76.
77.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 5--6; see also European Commission Press Release IP/21/6605, supra
European Commission Proposed Directive, supra note 67, at 4.
European Commission Press Release IP/21/6605, supra note 70.
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food delivery drivers as employees. 78 Labor Minister Yolanda Diaz
stated with pride, "Spain has become a world leader on this issue," and
"[t]he world and Europe are both looking to us." 79
In September, 2020, Spain's Supreme Court ruled that the relationship between food delivery drivers and app-based company Glovo
is "of a professional nature" meaning the food delivery drivers are employees not independent contractors. 80 This court ruling provided the
impetus for Spain's policymakers to create "La Ley del Rider" (the
"Rider Law"). 81 The Rider Law provides that app-based food delivery
drivers are not self-employed (independent contractors). 82 This means
that such drivers will have employment rights such as sick pay,
78. C.E., B.O.E. n. 113, May 12, 2021 (Spain); see Eoghan Gilmartin, Spain's
New 'Rider Law' Could Change the Gig Work Game, Tum. MAG. (June 6, 2021),
https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/06/spains-new-rider-law-could-change-the-gig-workgame.
79. Gorka R. Perez, Spain Approves Landmark Law Recognizing Food-Delivery Riders as Employees, EL PAIS (May 12, 2021, 9:54 AM), https://english.elpais.com/economy_and_business/2021-05-12/spain-approves-landmark-lawrecognizing-food-delivery-riders-as-employees.html.
80. Id.; see Gig Economy Shifts: Spain Makes Delivery Riders Employees,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 11, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/business-laws-legislation-spain-economy-b74bfd4cle8da05271853b069cb012b9; see also Glovo An-

nounces Improvements to the Working Conditions of Couriers in Consultation with
the Fairwork Project, FAIRWORK (Oct. 28, 2021), https://fair.work/en/fw/blog/glovoannounces-improvements-to-the-working-conditions-of-couriers-in-consultationwith-the-fairwork-project. Glovo announced a pledge-the Couriers Pledge-to improve working conditions for their workers. Id The Couriers Pledge offers policies
and social benefits for couriers; however, the pledge still falls short in standards
of fair work in several areas. See id. But see Pablo Agiiera & Tatiana L6pez,

Lessons from the Glovo Strikes in Spain-Interview with Carmen Juares,
FAIRWORK (Oct. 14, 2021), https://fair.work/en/fw/blog/lessons-from-the-glovostrikes-in-spain-interview-with-carrnen-juares. While the law took effect in May,
2021, by October of that year Glovo was still treating most of its workforce as
independent contractors. Agiiera & L6pez, supra. When asked if she thinks the
"ley rider" law will be successful in ensuring fairer standards for delivery riders,
Carmen Juares Palma (responsible for the Secretary ofNew Realities of Work and
Social and Solidary Economy at Comisiones Obreres (CCOO)) stated that the law
"sets the grounds to ensure labour rights and social protection for delivery riders
on digital platforms." Id. However, she noted that these rights will "only be
achieved if they are supported by mobilisations and complaints to the labour authorities from workers and unions." Id. She further observed that it is also necessary to improve the human and financial resources of the labor inspection services so they can take stronger actions against platform companies. Id.
81. See Agiiera & Lopez, supra note 80.
82. Id.
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disability benefits, breaks, and paid holidays. 83 Additionally, drivers
will no longer have to pay their own social security fees which provide
benefits such as unemployment subsidies and a public pension. 84 The
law also requires businesses to be transparent with food delivery drivers as to how algorithms and artificial intelligence affect their working
conditions, hiring decisions, and layoffs. 85
"Spain's [R]ider's [L]aw is the beginning of the end for false
self-employment across Europe," enthused Ludovic Voet, of the European Trade Union Confederation. 86 "It sets the standard for forthcoming EU action on platform companies-a worker must be recognized
as a worker. "87
While the law is designed to help riders, it may backfire in some
respects. Rather than change to meet the requirements of the law, Deliveroo may pull out of Spain. Deliveroo has stated that"[ t]he company
has determined that achieving and sustaining a top-tier market position
in Spain would require a disproportionate level of investment with
highly uncertain long-term potential returns that could impact the economic viability of the market for the company."88 But if Deliveroo
leaves, the other food delivery companies will likely embrace those riders left behind by Deliveroo.

Id.
Aritz Parra & Renata Brito, Spain Adopts Landmark Law to Protect 'Gig'
AM),
10:24
2021,
11,
(May
NEWS
ABC
Workers,
Delivery
https://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/wireStory/spain-adopts-landm ark-law-protectgig-delivery-workers-77 620461.
85. Perez, supra note 79. But see Antonio Aloisi, Platform Work in Europe:
Lessons Learned, Legal Developments and Challenges Ahead, 13 EUR. LABOUR L. J.
4, 8 (2022) (noting "[t]his collective right to information may contribute to making
algorithms more transparent, but systems of objection and redress are lagging"). Professor Aloisi further states: "By operating in conjunction with the GDPR, however,
the new provision could pave the way to a modem understanding of algorithmic accountability, combining national efforts and traditions on workplace monitoring with
the general EU framework on data protection." Id.
86. Tech28: Yolanda Diaz, Spain's Labor Minister, POLITICO EU,
https://www.politico.eu/list/tech-28-class-of-202 l-the-ranking/yolanda-diaz (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
87. Id.
88. Spain-Deliveroo Set to Pull Out of Spain Following Gig Economy Law
Changes (City A.M), STAFFING INDUS. ANALYSTS (Aug. 2, 2021 ), https://www2.staffingindustry.com/eng/Editorial/Daily-News/Spain-Deliveroo-set-to- pull-out-ofSpain-following-gig-economy-law-changes-City-A.M.-58563.
83.
84.
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C. The United Kingdom on Uber & Deliveroo

While it does not look like Parliament is considering adopting a
law like Spain's Rider Law, the definition of which app-based workers
qualify in the United Kingdom as workers entitled to safety net protections or a living/minimum wage received worldwide attention in 2021.
Uber drivers were found to be entitled to certain protections; Deliveroo
riders were found not entitled to collective bargaining. Both cases were
worker classification cases.
1. Uber
In February 2021, the United Kingdom's Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Uber's final appeal in Uber BV v. Aslam, a case regarding driver classification that spanned five years. 89 The court provided a detailed statutory interpretation analysis of the definition of
"worker" and expressed that classifying an individual as a "limb (b)
worker"90 is predicated on giving effect to the employment statute's
purpose. 91 Here, the purpose is "to protect vulnerable workers from
being paid too little for the work they do, required to work excessive

89. Uber BV v. Aslam [2021] UKSC 5 (UK); see also Mary-Ann Russon,
Uber Drivers Are Workers Not Self-Employed, Supreme Court Rules, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56123668.
90. A "limb (b) worker" is one that qualifies under the Employment Rights
Act 1996 as:
[A]n individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the
employment has ceased, worked under)-(a) a contract of employment, or
(b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it
is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual
undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services
for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue
of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession
or business undertaking carried on by the individual; and any
reference to a worker's contract shall be construed accordingly.
Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, § 230(3)(b) (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/section/230.
91. Uber BV v. Aslam [2021] UKSC 5, [71]-[72] (UK).
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hours or subjected to other forms of unfair treatment (such as being
victimized for whistleblowing)."92
In the UK, employment law recognizes three types of workers:
"[ 1]those employed under a contract of employment; [2] those self-employed people who are in business on their own account and undertake
work for their clients or customers; and [3] an intermediate class of
workers who are self-employed but who provide their services as part
93
of a profession or business undertaking carried on by someone else."
A limb (b) worker is represented by 3 above- the intermediate worker
between category 1 and 2-that provides "their services as part of a
94
profession or business undertaking carried on by someone else. "
The court stated that in determining which workers are vulnerable (and thereby in need of statutory protection), one must consider the
"subordination to and dependence upon another person in relation to
the work done. "95 Elaborating further the court noted that:
[A] touchstone of such subordination and dependence
is (as has long been recognized in employment law) the
degree of control exercised by the putative employer
over the work or services performed by the individual
concerned. The greater the extent of such control, the
stronger the case for classifying the individual as a
[limb (b) worker] .... 96

92. Id. at 71.
93. Id. at 38 (citing Baroness Hale of Richmond in Bates van Winkelhof v.
Clyde & Co LLP [2014] UKSC 32).
94. Id. The Aslam court continues:
Limb (b) of the statutory definition of a "worker's contract" has
three elements: (1) a contract whereby an individual undertakes to
perform work or services for the other party; (2) an undertaking to
do the work or perform the services personally; and (3) a requirement that the other party to the contract is not a client or customer
of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual.

Id. at 41. Elements 2 and 3 were not at issue. Id. "It is not in dispute that the claimant
drivers worked under contracts whereby they undertook to perform driving services
personally; and it is not suggested that any Uber company was a client or customer of
the claimants." Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 87.
96. Id.
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The court determined that Uber drivers were in a position of
subordination to Uber [where] "the only way in which they can increase
their earnings is by working longer hours while constantly meeting
Uber's measures of performance."97 In determining subordination and
control, the court emphasized five aspects of the employment tribunal's
findings:
1. The "remuneration paid to drivers for the work they do
is fixed by Uber and the drivers have no say in it ( other
than by choosing when and how much to work)." 98
2. The contractual terms are dictated by Uber. 99
3. "[A]lthough drivers have the freedom to choose when
and where (within the area covered by their PHV licence)
to work, once a driver has logged onto the Uber app, a
driver's choice about whether to accept requests for rides
is constrained by Uber." 100 One way Uber controls the
driver is by controlling the information provided to the
driver. 101 Another way is by monitoring the driver's rate
of acceptance (and cancellation) of trip requests. 102
4. Uber significantly controls the way in which drivers
deliver their services by vetting the ~e of car and
providing routes for the driver to take. 10
5. Uber disallows and makes it more difficult for communication between the driver and the passenger to transpire.104
The above enumerated facts tipped the scales for the court to find that
Uber drivers meet the requirements of protected workers. 105 Because
of the ruling, Uber drivers are to be afforded a minimum wage

97.
98.
99.
100.
IOI.
102.
103.
I 04.
105.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 101.
at 94.
at 95.
at 96.
at 97.
at 98.
at I 00.
at 101.
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(National Living Wage equal to £8.72/hour), holiday pay, and participation in pension benefits. 106
Uber has reported that its drivers will earn at least a minimum
wage after accepting a trip request and expenses. 107 Drivers will also
get holiday pay equal to 12.07% of their earnings, paid every two
weeks. 108 Additionally, they will be enrolled in a pension plan that both
drivers and Uber will contribute to. 109
The ruling applies only to Uber drivers, not other ridesharing
apps. As a result, Uber launched a rideshare driver recruitment marketing campaign highlighting the benefits that they are providing their
drivers (as compared to their competitors): 110
Sickness cover for drivers ➔ Just what the doctor ordered-Only on Uber. 111
Every car comes with an out of office
holiday pay-Only on Uber. 112

➔

Drivers earn

But as Uber touts the benefits it provides, it is also calling for compliance by competitors. 113 At the time of this writing, there does not
106. Ryan Browne, Uber Employment Rights Setback Is a "Gut Punch" to Its
AM),
3:27
2021,
18,
(Mar.
CNBC
UK,
the
in
Prospects
https://www .cnbc.com/2021 /03/18/uber-is-reclassifying-uk-drivers-as-workers-heres-what-happens-next.html. Tom Vickers, a senior lecturer in sociology at Nottingham Trent University and head of the Work Futures Research Group, which studies
the jobs that people do and how they change over time, has stated, "The central point
for me is that the ruling focuses on the control that companies exercise over people's
labour[-]this control also carries with it responsibilities for their conditions and wellbeing." Russon supra note 89.
107. Kelvin Chan, Uber to Give UK Drivers Minimum Wage, Pension, Holiday
Pay, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 16, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/minimum-wageeurope-cb l 5b4aff66c3838ef94 70 l 92c9fcefd.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Ellen Ormesher, After Trying to Deny Them, Uber is Using Driver Rights
2021),
1,
(July
DRUM
THE
USP,
Marketing
a
as
https://www.thedrum.com/news/2021 /07/01 /after-trying-deny-them-uber-usingdriver-rights-marketing-usp.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Simon Duke, Uber Claims Rivals Deny Drivers Their Rights, THE
SUNDAY TIMES (June 30, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uberclaims-rivals-deny-drivers-their-rights-jp7q78x72; Jonathan Keane, Uber Calls for
UK Rivals to Follow Court Ruling on Driver Status, FORBES (July 13, 2021, 6:53 AM),
https ://www .forbes.com/sites/jonathankeane/2021 /07 / 13/uber-calls-for-uk-rivals-to-

658

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 52

appear to be any movement in the UK Parliament to codify the Aslam
ruling.
2. Deliveroo
On June 24, 2021, the Court of Appeal ruled that Deliveroo riders do not meet the definition of "worker" for purposes of eligibility for
collective bargaining rights. 114 The statutory definition of worker for
collective bargaining purposes is similar but not identical to the Employment Rights Act 1996 § 230(3) which was used in the Aslam case
above. 115 In looking at precedent, the court compared the test-"the
right to use substitutes, the right to choose which tasks to accept, the
right to work for a competitor," and the right to choose at what time
within a prescribed time slot to make a delivery. 116
The court stated that the primary issue in this case was whether
the riders were required to personally provide the service or whether

follow-court-ruling-on-driver-status ("The other operators, and not just the other appbased operators, but the model that we operate is very common in the taxi and private
hire industry in general. I think when they look at those details, although it's specifically Uber drivers who brought the case, those things will be true to them. We operate
the same model as them and therefore they need to step up.").
114. lndep. Workers Union of Gr. Brit. v. Cent. Arb. Comm., [2021] EWCA
(Civ) 952 (Eng.).
115. Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, c. 52, §
296(1) (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/52/section/296. This Act
defines a ''worker" as:
an individual who works, or normally works or seeks to work(a) under a contract of employment, or
(b) under any other contract whereby he undertakes to do
or perform personally any work or services for another party
to the contract who is not a professional client of his, or
(c) in employment under or for the purposes of a
government department (otherwise than as a member of the
naval, military or air forces of the Crown) in so far as
such employment does not fall within paragraph (a) or (b)
above.
Id
116. Indep. Workers Union of Gr. Brit. v. Cent. Arb. Comm., [2021] EWCA
(Civ) 952 [71] (Eng.)(discussing B v. Yodel Delivery Network Ltd, [2020] IRLR 550).
The court dismissed the last part of the test as not one that would make a "decisive
difference." Id
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they could utilize a substitute. 117 The court reviewed the Deliveroo
Supplier's Agreements and noted that riders are permitted to have a
substitute execute their deliveries. I18 Ultimately, the court found that
since a right of substitution existed, it did not matter whether workers
19
actually took advantage of that right-just that the right was genuine. 1
As such, the court found that Deliveroo drivers were not entitled to organize because they were not in an employment relationship with Deliveroo. 120

***
One can see that app-based companies are not treated the same
for all reasons, i.e., there is no blanket rule that holds all app-based
companies and their interactions with those who work for them are the
same. One important distinguishing point between the Deliveroo case
and the Aslam case is that Uber did not have a substitution clause in its
driver agreement which was deemed important when looking at a personal service requirement. I21 Another distinction made by the court is
that the facts were different in both cases. 122 As such, the Deliveroo
court considered the Aslam case of limited relevance. 123
Still, the Aslam case is providing momentum for app-based
workers in other countries. "The ruling sent shockwaves around the
world as the jurisprudence could be adopted in other countries and
124
Uber
change the entire model of how digital taxi services operate."
drivers in other countries are initiating legal actions in the hopes that

117. Id. at 23.
118. Id. at 24.
119. Id. at 26 ("The concern to which tribunals must be alive is that armies of
lawyers will simply place substitution clauses, or clauses denying any obligations to
accept or provide work in employment contracts, as a matter of form, even where such
terms do not begin to reflect the real relationship.")(quoting Kalwak v. Consistent
Group Ltd. [2007] IRLR 560).
120. Id at 85-86.
121. Id. at 85.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Ndungu Jay, Hope for Digital Taxi Drivers as Kenya Considers Historic
https://nairobi2021),
24,
(Feb.
TIMES
NAIROBI
Directive,
times.co.ke/2021/02/24/bope-for-digital-taxi-drivers-as-kenya-considers-historic-directive (quoting Cabinet Sec'y Lab. & Soc. Prot., Simon Chelugui).
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their own courts will apply the rationale in Aslam. 125 And worker advocacy groups are using the Aslam case to pressure policymakers into
classifying workers in a manner that will allow them protections. 126
"We call on the government to follow in the UK footsteps and give
drivers their rights." 127 However, some countries' worker classification laws are binary (employee or independent contractor) and do not
have a middle worker classification like the UK does. For those countries with an intermediate classification or the willingness to create one,
Aslam may be more persuasive; for those that do not, it may not be.
Regardless, countries are hoping their courts and policymakers will
find inspiration from the UK Supreme Court due to the subordination
analysis.
D. Denmark's Agreement re: Delivery Drivers

In Denmark, agreements that cover pay and conditions are dealt
with at the industry level rather than the governmental level. 128 In February, 2021, the 3F trade union worked directly with app-based food
delivery company, Just Eat, to reach a "national sectoral agreement." 129
125. Jay, supra note 124; South Africa-Uber Set to Face Class Action Lawsuit
as Drivers Demand Employee Rights, STAFFING INDUS. ANALYSTS (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www2.staffingindustry.com/eng/Editorial/Daily-News/South-Africa-Uberset-to-face-class-action-lawsuit-as-drivers-demand-employee-rights-56882 ("Richard
Meeran [attorney at] Leigh Day said, 'The ruling by the UK Supreme Court is a final
vindication for UK Uber drivers who have for too long been denied their statutory
employment rights as workers. We hope that this class action in South Africa will
enable South African Uber drivers to access those same rights."'); Bianca Healey,
Uber Drivers from Sydney and Melbourne Have Launched Legal Action to Prove They
Are Employees, Hoping to Emulate a Landmark UK Win, Bus. INSIDER AUSTL. (Aug.
2, 2021 ), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/uber-drivers-legal-challenge.
126. Jay, supra note 124.
127. Id. (quoting Secretary-General to the Digit. Partners Soc'y,Wycliffe Alutalala).
128. Collective Bargaining, EUR. TRADE UNION INST., https://www.workerparticipation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Denmark/Collective-Bargaining (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
129. 3F Secures Ground-Breaking National Sectoral Agreement for Delivery
Riders, EUR. TRANSP. WORKERS' FED'N (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.etf-europe.org/3f-secures-ground-breaking-national-sectoral-agreement-for-delivery-riders. Food delivery platform, Foodora, reached a collective bargaining agreement with
Norway riders in September 2019. Union Win! Historic Agreementfor Food Delivery
Workers,
INT'L
TRANSP.
WORKERS'
FED'N
(Oct.
7,
2019),
https://www.itfglobal.org/en/news/union-win-historic-agreement-food-deliveryworkers. Foodora and the Fellesforbundet union reached an agreement that includes
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The agreement secures workers a minimum wage that increases over a
two year period. 130 Additionally, the workweek duration is a minimum
131
If the work exof eight hours and can go up to thirty-seven hours.
132
ceeds thirty-seven hours, overtime is allowed up to forty-four hours.
"Among other provisions, a platform company will also be obliged to
provide their employees with a vehicle (or an allowance if the em133
ployee has its own), work clothes, and safety equipment."

***
While countries around the world have been making countrywide strides in providing safety net protections for app-based workers-some classifying workers as employees, while others classifying
them in a position between traditional employees and independent contractors-the United States has not clearly addressed classification of
app-based workers on a federal level. Our federal government is still
trying to use old tests, although bills have been submitted to change or
modify the tests. 134 The next part discusses the tests that are being used
by the federal government.

an annual pay increase for full-time riders. Id. The agreement also guarantees the
Foodora riders "a winter allowance and compensation for the use of equipment at work
such as bikes, clothes and smartphones." Id.
130. 3F Secures Ground-Breaking National Sectoral Agreement for Delivery
Riders, supra note 129.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id
134. For example, the PRO Act passed in the U.S. House of Representatives on
March 9, 2021, but has not passed in the Senate. H.R. 842-Protecting the Right to
Organize Act of 2021, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bilV842 (last visited Apr. 10, 2022). The PRO Act would require use of
the ABC test for determining worker classification for NLRA purposes. See H.R. 842,
117th Cong. (2021 ). ln states that use the ABC test, courts have typically found that
app-based workers should be classified as employees. See infra note 219; see also
supra note 24. President Biden's campaign pledge indicated he would like the ABC
test to be used for multiple purposes: "The ABC test will mean many more workers
will get the legal protections and benefits they rightfully should receive. As president,
Biden will work with Congress to establish a federal standard modeled on the ABC
test for all labor, employment, and tax laws." See The Eiden Plan for Strengthening
Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions, supra note 24.
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IV. FEDERAL WORKER CLASSIFICATION TESTS IN THE UNITED STATES
At the federal level in the United States, there are three main
common law factor-based tests for determining a worker's status: the
control test, the entrepreneurial opportunities test, and the economic
realities test. 135 The control test and economic realities test have
broader use, but all three tests are presented herein to include coverage
of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). Each of these
tests has numerous factors that must be weighed to determine whether
a worker is an employee or independent contractor. Notably, these tests
are all used for different statutory determinations and have been said to
fail to provide workers, hiring entities, and the courts with a foundational basis for classifying workers. 136 Additionally, the tests are considered unpredictable. 137
135. See infra Part V.C. (covering the IRS twenty-factor test because several
states recently adopted its use).
136. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Opposite Sides of the Same Coin: Worker Classification in the New Economy, 37 HOFSTRA L. & EMP. L.J. 93, 102-04 (2019).
137. Due to this unpredictability, the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Third) ofEmployment Law adopted a test that was created after an evaluation of the
worker classification tests and court opinions applying them. In the section entitled
"Conditions for Existence of Employment Relationship," the Restatement provides:
(a) Except as provided in §l.02 and §l.03, an individual renders
services as an employee of an employer if:
(1) the individual acts, at least in part, to serve the interests
of the employer;
(2) the employer consents to receive the individual's services; and
(3) the employer controls the manner and means by which
the individual renders services, or the employer otherwise effectively prevents the individual from rendering services as an
independent businessperson.
(b) An individual renders services as an independent businessperson and not as an employee when the individual in his or her own
interest exercises entrepreneurial control over important business decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign assistants,
whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and
when to provide service to other customers.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW§ l.0l (AM. L. INST. 2015).
The Restatement's endeavor was to "provide guiding principles to render the multi factor tests more focused and predictable." Michael C. Harper, Focusing the MultiFactor Tests for Employee Status: The Restatement's Entrepreneurial Formulation,
(Bos.
Univ.
Sch.
of L.,
Working
Paper
No.
15-51,
2015),
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A. The Control Test

Since the 1800s, workers have been classified as either "employees" or "independent contractors." 138 The control or right-to-control test was created in England and appropriated by the United
States. 139 Originally, the classification significance regarded tort liability-respondeat superior. 140 This agency law tort liability test was
designed to determine whether a principal "controlled" the work of its
agent such that if the agent committed a tort, the principal would

https://scholarship.law. bu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1800&context=faculty_ scholarship. Regarding app-based work, Professors Garden and Slater critique
the Restatement, acknowledging that it provides useful guidance but that it falls short
by not providing:
[A] clearly articulated statement regarding the various purposes of the employee/independent contractor dichotomy in different contexts [which] would have been useful to decision makers,
and would have promoted justice by making it more difficult for
enterprises to evade employer status by offloading supervision
tasks onto customers and control onto algorithms.
Charlotte Garden & Joseph Slater, Comments on Restatement ofEmployment Law
(Third), Chapter 1, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J., 265, 303 (2017).
138. See Prince, supra note 29, at 48 n.13. The common law distinction between employees and independent contractors originated in England and was originally an agency law question. It was first used in the United States in Boswell v. Laird,
8 CAL. 469, 489-90 (Cal. 1857). See also Carlson, supra note 32, at 302; Gerard M.
Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188, 189-90 (1939).
139. Carlson, supra note 32, at 302---05; Stevens, supra note 138, at 194--95;
Jooho Lee, The Entrepreneurial Responsibilities Test, 92 TUL. L. REV. 777, 786--91
(2020).
140. Stevens, supra note 138, at 195; see Michael C. Duff, All the World's a
Platform?: Some Remarks on 'Marketplace Platform' Employment Laws, U. WYO.
COLL. L.: FAC. SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2020), https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1074&context=faculty_articles. Professor Duff stated the:
[C]reation of the independent contractor category may simply
have been a strategy allowing masters to escape tort liability created by putative servants. In other words, creating a category of
"not servants" may have had more to do with a "push" policy of
tort-liability-avoidance than a "pull" policy of consciously-allocative tort compensation (leaving entirely to one side questions of
employment law-including workers' compensation---coverage)"

Id.
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appropriately be vicariously liable. 141 If an agent was subject to sufficient control by the principal/hiring entity, then it was reasonable to
hold such principal/hiring entity liable to the third-party plaintiff. 142
This worker was classified as an "employee." Hence, if an employee
committed a tort, the hiring entity/employer would be liable to the injured plaintiff. 143
Numerous scholars have challenged the prudence of parlaying
the control test and using it for means other than tort liability. 144 Regardless, several federal statutes and their corresponding administrative
agencies continue to use versions of the control test to determine a
worker's classification for reasons other than tort liability including:
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(BRISA), Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA), Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 145 NLRA, 146
141. See Duff, supra note 140.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. L. INST. 1958); Gasal V.
CHS Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1013 (D.N.D. 2011); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968); see Acevedo, supra note 39, at 799;
Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics,
10 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REv. 479, 484-85 (2016) (discussing the "control test" under
the common law of agency).
143. Vicarious liability through the doctrine of respondeat superior is a problem that needs to be addressed when it comes to app-based work. See Agnieszka
McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New Sharing Economy, 49 CONN. L. REV. 171,
192-95 (2016); see also Travis Clark, The Gig is Up: An Analysis ofthe Gig-Economy
and an Outdated Worker Classification System in Need ofReform, 19 SEATTLE J. FOR
Soc. JUST. 769, 795-96 (2021) (proffering that states-Washington State in particular-should impose vicarious liability on app-based companies).
144. Rogers, supra note 142, at 486; Sprague, supra note 31, at 60.
145. The IRS divides facts that provide evidence of the degree of control into
three categories: behavioral control, financial control, and the relationship between
the parties. I.RS. Publication 15-A, Cat. No. 21453T, at 7 (2021). These categories
essentially categorize the twenty factors from Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 into
buckets. See i,ifra Part V.C. Note that the twenty factors align well with the Restatement's Agency control test. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 219 (AM. L.
INST. 1958). See generally, S.D. Watson, Who's an Employee, 9 1. PENSION BENEFITS
20 (2002); Paul F. McGee, David A Goodof, Jayanti Bandyopadhyay, & Andrew
Christensen, Misgivings ofMisclassification of Workers: Tax Gaps, 14 COMPETITION
F. 222 (2016).
146. See infra Part IV.B. The NLRB and the D.C. circuit court have modified
the strict use of the control test by inserting "entrepreneurial opportunity." See i,ifra
Part IV.B. Also of note, in February, 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
the PRO Act which would change from using the control test to the ABC test for
purposes of worker classification in the NLRA. See HR. 842-Protecting the Right
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Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN). 147 Additionally, many courts use the control test
as a default when the term "employee" is not statutorily defined. 148
The control test holds that a worker is an employee if the hiring
entity "controlled or had the right to control the manner and means" 149
of the worker's work. To make this determination, the totality of the
circumstances is viewed while weighing a lengthy list of factors:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the
[employer] may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in
the locality, the work is usually done under the direction
of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of [employer] and [employee]; and

to Organize Act of 2021, supra note 134. However, as of this writing, the PRO Act
has not passed the Senate. Id.
147. See generally Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 661, 679 (2013) (arguing that the control test "no
longer represents our modem notion of what it means to be an employee"); Michael
W. Fox, Who's an Employee, Who's the Employer? It's Not as Easy as You Might
Think, 2016 TXCLE Bus. DISP. 12 app. 25 (describing the tests used under various
federal labor and employment laws).
148. See Lee, supra note 139, at 788-89.
149. Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318,325 (1974); see also Logue v. United
States, 412 U.S. 521, 527 n.5 (1973).
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G) whether the principal is or is not in business. 150

The control test makes sense when it comes to tort liability because if the hiring entity has sufficient control over the worker, it is in
the best position to prevent the harm. However, this rationale fails
when applying it to other areas of the law. "Large firms are often better
positioned to ensure compliance with employment laws than their
thinly-capitalized contractors and suppliers. Indeed, given its relatively
narrow definition of employment, the control test affirmatively incentivizes companies to avoid employment law obligations by restructuring work relationships as contracting relationships." 151 Using the control test to classify a worker as employee or independent contractor for
purposes of anti-discrimination laws, such as ADEA, ADA or Title
VII, makes little to no sense.
When it comes to app-based platform work, the control test does
not provide consistent results. In the eyes of numerous judges and commentators, Uber (by example) has the right to control its drivers and
therefore its drivers should be considered employees. 152 According to
Professors Charlotte Garden and Joseph Slater:
To the extent that there is a dominant view among labor
and employment scholars, it seems to be that the
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958); see also
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,323 (1992).
151. Rogers, supra note 142, at 486; Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6 (2010); see also Noah D.
Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 283, 288-89 (2011).
152. See Garden & Slater, supra note 137, at 295 (2017). When referring to
app-based work, Professors Garden and Slater have observed: "Some commentators
have persuasively argued that Uber drivers qualify as employees under existing tests,
but that is certainly not the only view." Id.; see also Elizabeth Tippett, Employee
Classification in the United States, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
THE SHARING ECONOMY 291 (Nestor M. Davidson, Michele Fink, & John J. lnfranca
eds., 2018); Noah Zatz, Does Work Have a Future If the Labor Market Does Not?, 91
Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1081, 1086 (2016). See generally Nicholas L. DeBruyne, Uber
Drivers: A Disputed Employment Relationship in Light of the Sharing Economy, 92
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 289, 307 (2017). See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1673,
1682 (2016) for a discussion of how the sharing economy involves both non-compliance and avoidance and how the sharing economy makes it more difficult for companies to "identify control when it is exerted through software."
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difficulty of applying the traditional factors [is] wholly
unsatisfactory; this group often advocates for new approaches to distinguishing independent contractors
from employees, or to regulating work in the app-based
economy altogether. 153

B. The Entrepreneurial Opportunity Test (NLRA)
The NLRA uses the term "employee" when determining who
has the right to organize. 154 As stated above, numerous federal statutes,
including the NLRA use the control test or massage it. Currently there
is dissention regarding what the actual test should be for classifying
workers for NLRA purposes. 155 In NLRB v. United Insurance Company of America, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the common law
agency principles (i.e., the control test) are used to determine whether
an individual is an employee or independent contractor under the
NLRA. 156 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) added to the
foregoing test an entrepreneurial opportunity consideration that originally looked more like an additional factor---one not having any more
weight than the others. 157 But somewhat recently the NLRB adopted a
153. Garden & Slater, supra note 137, at 295.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, defines a covered "employee" excluding "any individual having the status of an independent contractor." Id.
155. See Atlanta Opera, Inc., 371 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (2021); see also SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (2019) (Mcferran, J., dissenting) (citing the
NLRB's inconsistent application of the control test); Micah Prieb Stoltzfus Jost, Note,
Independent Contractors, Employees, and Entrepreneurialism Under the National
Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-Worker Approach, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 311
(2011).
156. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). The Court
further elaborated that the Restatement (Second) ofAgency §220 factors are to be used
and that there is "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the
answer, but all the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no
one factor being decisive." Id. at 258; see also Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B
at *12-14.
157. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B 610, at 620 (2014). The
NLRB utilized this case to further explore the significance of entrepreneurial opportunity as a factor. Id. Before FedEx Home Delivery, the Board previously considered
entrepreneurial opportunity as part of its application of the control test but emphasized
that no single factor was determinative. See, e.g., Dial-a-Mattress Operating Corp.,
326 N.L.R.B 884, 891 (1998) (evaluating common law agency principles as well as
"significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss" in determining the employee
status of customer delivery service workers).
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more expansive use of entrepreneurial opportunities in making worker
classification decisions in the Supershuttle case. 158 The impetus behind
this shift emanated from the use of this entrepreneurial focus by the
D.C. Circuit court. This lesser known test (or modification of the control test) is referred to as the Entrepreneurial Opportunities Test. 159
According to the NLRB, "entrepreneurial opportunity is not an
independent common-law factor, let alone a 'super factor' ... [n]or is
it an 'overriding consideration, 'a shorthand formula' or a 'trump card'
in the independent-contractor analysis." 160 Instead, to explain in the
NLRB's words, the "Board [] evaluate[s] the common-law factors
through the prism of entrepreneurial opportunity when the specific factual circumstances of the case make such an evaluation appropriate." 161
The Entrepreneurial Opportunity Test was described as an "important
animating principle" by which to evaluate the control test factors, i.e.,

158. Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B at *9. See Lee, supra note 139, at
798; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353,
357 (2011); see also Roadway Package System, 288 N.L.R.B 196 (1988); Standard
Oil Co., 230 N.L.R.B 967,968 (1977); Tanya Goldman & David Weil, Who's Responsible Here? Establishing Responsibility in the Fissured Workplace (Inst. for New
Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 114, 2020), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3551446 (describing the NLRB's shift in focus from control to
economic dependency in the employer-employee relationship).
The NLRB has examined entrepreneurial opportunity in the past, but its application has evolved. While mention of entrepreneurialism was earlier than 1976, it wasn't
until then that the NLRB consistently started incorporating it as a consideration in
their worker classification cases. For instance, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, the
U.S. Supreme Court found itself trying to distinguish between "employment'' and "entrepreneurial enterprise." The Court considered many factors as relevant when making this determination, to wit, the permanency of the newsboys' relationship with
Hearst, their limited ability to control their profit or loss, the extent to how integral
they were to the business, their relative investment, and their lack of control over the
terms and conditions of their work. NLRB v. Hearst Pub! 'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 124-25
(1944). However, shortly thereafter, in 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act,
which the Court interpreted as a "rejection of Hearst and a return to the common law
control test." Goldman & Weil, supra, at 21. For additional information on the history
of worker classification determination, see Jost, supra note 155, at 315-32.
159. Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
FedEx Home Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See Jost,
supra note 155, at 318-25, for an excellent, detailed explanation of the evolution of
the definition of "employee" for NLRA purposes.
160. Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B at * 15.
161. Id.
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"whether the position presents the opportunities and risks inherent in
entrepreneurialism." 162
Of note, however, is that other NLRB decisions are not all in
sync with the Supershuttle case, and Member (now Chairman) McFerran wrote a very detailed, persuasive dissent in that case. 163 McFerran
stated that the Entrepreneurial Opportunity Test is not really a test at
all. 164 Rather, consideration of the entrepreneurial opportunities is another factor to weigh with the other Restatement factors. 165
Consideration of entrepreneurial opportunities generally requires a look at whether workers have a "significant entrepreneurial
opportunity for gain or loss." 166 "When examining entrepreneurial opportunities, [the court] ... consider[s] the opportunities created by the
position to 'take[] economic risk and ha[ve] the corresponding opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just harder."' 167 Workers
who have opportunities to work "harder" but not "smarter," are more
like employees than independent contractors. 168 Examples of working
"smarter" -and therefore more like independent contractors-are factually distinct but have been phrased as having the ability to hire individuals to either satisfy, or assist with, the hired-for task and make a

162. Id. at *12 (quoting FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497).
163. See id. at *24 (discussing the lack of support for the majority's claim that
entrepreneurial opportunity is at the core of the control test). Member Mcferran further explains that none of the Restatement factors embody the concept of entrepreneurial opportunity. Id. at *25.
164. Id. at *24-25.
165. Id.
166. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra v. NLRB, 822 F.3d 563, 565-66 (D.C. Cir.
2016); Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. NLRB, 926 F.3d 837, 840 (D.C. Cir.
2019); Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. 1522, 1522 (2000), enforced sub.
nom. Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Slay
Transp. Co., 331 N.L.R.B. 1292, 1294 (2000).
167. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 822 F.3d at 569 (quoting Corp. Express
Delivery Sys., 292 F.3d at 780).
168. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass 'n, 926 F.3d at 842 (citing Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 822 F.3d at 569).
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profit from their assistance, 169 and having control over the amount of
time they allocate to a task. 170
As stated above, the D.C. Circuit court uses this test for NLRA
matters but not all circuits do. 171 Regardless of its recent use, some
scholars and judges have criticized the Entrepreneurial Opportunity
Test either stating it is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent172 or that the definition of entrepreneur is not properly considered

169. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 292 F.3d at 780; Ariz. Republic, 349 N.L.R.B. 1040,
1044--45 (2007) (finding that carriers were independent contractors because they had
entrepreneurial potential to increase their income where they could use fill-time substitutes); Argix Direct, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 1017, 1020-21 (2004) (finding that some
of the drivers were entrepreneurs who owned multiple trucks and hired their own drivers); Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 326 N.L.R.B 884, 891 (1998) (finding that the
drivers were independent contractors because they had significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss where they could own multiple trucks and hire their own
employees without being subject to employer control). But see Slay Transp. Co., 331
N.L.R.B. at 1294 (finding that despite the drivers having the ability to hire their own
drivers, the employer's control of the compensation and pricing nullified any potential
economic gain and noting that a "theoretical potential for entrepreneurial opportunity"
was not enough to classify the drivers as independent contractors).
170. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass 'n, 926 F.3d at 842 ("Lacrosse officials
have no control over the length of the games they referee, and they may not hire assistants, assign games to others, or find cheaper replacements and pocket the difference.") (citations omitted); see also Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 292 F.3d at 780 (taking into account Corporate Express owner-operators' freedom to manage their time
on the job); FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 499-500 ("[C]ontractors do not need
to show up at work every day (or ever, for that matter); instead, at their discretion,
they can take a day, a week, a month, or more off, so long as they hire another to be
there.").
171. See Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 292 F.3d at 779; Alexander v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to use the
D.C. Circuit's FedEx decision approach, noting that there was "no indication that California had replaced its longstanding right-to-control test with the new entrepreneurial
opportunities test developed by the D.C. Circuit"). The Alexander court further stated
that under California law, the sort of company-constrained entrepreneurial opportunities available to the drivers "did not override other factors in [the] multi-factor analysis." 765 F.3d at 993-94. Some courts have utilized entrepreneurial opportunity as
part of their testing. See NLRB. v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir.
2008); Doud v. Yellow Cab ofReno, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1092 (D. Nev. 2015);
Crew One Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 811 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016).
172. See Hirsch, supra note 158, at 357; see also FedEx Home Delivery, 563
F.3d at 504 (Garland, J., dissenting); Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75,
at *22 (2019) (Mcferran, J., dissenting). Member Mcferran wrote that the Board
majority adopted a confused approach "which cannot be reconciled with common-law
principles or Supreme Court authority." Supershuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. at *22
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in the determination of the entrepreneurial opportunities. 173 Another
flaw noted is that the Entrepreneurial Opportunities Test has been applied in a manner that determines the "entrepreneurial potential offered
to all workers, rather than the realities of the actual relationship between the worker and the hiring company." 174
If the U.S. federal government adopts the ABC test via the Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2021 (PRO Act) or some other
similar bill, these issues will likely become moot but that does not mean
that we should rubbers tamp the ABC test. 175 As of this writing, NLRB
Chairman Mcferran has called for comments or suggestions on which

173. See Lee, supra note 139, at 830-32. Lee observes that judges seem to rely
on their own "common sense notions of entrepreneurship as profit seeking or risk taking" but that they do not have a "theoretical understanding of what entrepreneurship
actually is and why it matters." Id. at 781. Through his own proposed Entrepreneurial
Responsibilities Test, Lee draws on three classic theories of entrepreneurship derived
from Frank Knight, Joseph Schumpeter, and Israel Kirzner to create a true definition
of"entrepreneur." Id. at 781-83. Lee defines the entrepreneur as someone who "assumes entrepreneurial responsibility for her economic activity." Id. at 811; see also
Pivateau, supra note 136, at 119-24.
Pivateau's proposal goes beyond the Entrepreneurial Opportunity Test set forth by
the D.C. Circuit by not only requiring "genuine opportunity, but the existence of actual
entrepreneurship." Id. at 108. Pivateau's test requires a court to consider each dimension of entrepreneurship: process (innovation), behavior (risk), and outcome (results).
Id. at 119-25. For more on building entrepreneurship into tests, see Margaret Kobia
& Damary Sikalieh, Towards a Search for the Meaning of Entrepreneurship, 34 J.
EUR. INDUS. TRAINING 110, 111 (201 O); Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens ofInnovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 952 (2016); Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as
Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 106, 106-15 (2018). But see Veena B.
Dubai, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism ofLegal Worker Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 65, 134 (2017). In her article examining the taxi industry,
Dubai provides a critique of the use of working-class entrepreneurship as a means of
classifying workers. See id. at 67. She states that the current reliance or focus on
entrepreneurship for determining a worker's classification relies on the neoliberal belief that workers benefit or prosper by being free of state protections. See id. at 89.
Further she notes that legalizing ride-sharing companies in California "produced casual, insecure work, were validated through the pretense of working-class entrepreneurship, and were devised through new business models that transferred corporate
risk onto workers." Id. at 98.
174. David K. Millon, Keeping Hope Alive, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 369, 372
(2011) (referring to FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
Millon points out that in this case, all drivers were found to be independent contractors, even though some did not meet the test in reality and they would have been employees under the "traditional, long-established principles of agency law." Id.; see
also Jost, supra note 15 5, at 311.
175. See irifra Part V.A.
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test the NLRB should apply; options better than the ABC test may avail
themselves through the open comment process. 176
C. The Traditional Economic Realities Test & the Trump DoL 's
Version

The FLSA uses the term "employee" when determining who is
protected under federal minimum wage, and overtime laws. 177 The
FLSA uses the "economic realities test" to classify workers as either
employees or independent contractors. 178 This test originated from two
1947 U.S. Supreme Court cases 179 and has evolved into a list comprised
of the following factors: (1) The degree of the alleged employer's right
to control the manner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the
alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his
managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment
or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers; (4)
whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the degree of
permanence of the working relationship; and (6) whether the service
rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business. 180
Conceptually, a worker is an employee if "as a matter of economic reality, the worker follows the usual path of an employee and is
dependent on the business which he or she serves."181 One of the justifications for use of this test is that workers who are economically dependent on their hiring entities are vulnerable due to their lack of bargaining power as compared to those who have greater bargaining
176. See Atlanta Opera, Inc., 371 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (2021), and supra note 22
for details regarding the comment request.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).
178. See Bodie, supra note 147, at 663; see, e.g., Sec'y of Lab. v. Lauritzen,
835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (using the "economic realities" test to interpret
"employee" in the context of the FLSA); Schultz v. Cap. Int'l Sec., Inc., 460 F.3d 595,
602 (4th Cir. 2006); Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008).
179. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947); see also
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947).
180. Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 86
Fed. Reg. 14027, 14029 (Mar. 12, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 780, 788,
795).
181. See U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET 13:
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA)
(2008); See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992). This
is a circular definition given that the term employee is used to define the term employee. See id. at 323.
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power because they would only be limited by laws or regulations as to
what they can negotiate. 182 Judge Easterbrook in a 1987 concurring
opinion stated:
Indeed, the details of independent contractor relations are
fundamentally contractual. Firms can structure their
dealings as "employment" or "independent contractor"
to maximize the efficiency of incentives to work, monitor, and take precautions. The FLSA is designed to defeat rather than implement contractual arrangements ...
. In this sense "economic reality" rather than contractual
form is indeed dispositive . . . . [M]igrant workers are
selling nothing but their labor. They have no physical
capital and little human capital to vend. 183
The economic realities test has been widely criticized as being
circular because it uses the word "employee" when defining an employee.184 Nevertheless, it is used to determine whether a worker is an
employee for purposes of the FLSA as well as the Family Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) since the FMLA adopted the FLSA definition of employee. 185
On its face, the economic realities test appears quite like the control test because the tests share common factors. 186 Of note is the first
enumerated factor, which is the right to control.
Control of employment opportunities is the linchpin of
the economic realities test, viewed from the perspective
of the employee's dependency on the employer and the
182. See Bodie, supra note 147, at 686; Lee, supra note 139, at 793.
183. Sec'y of Lab., U.S. Dep't of Lab. v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544-45
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
184. Bodie, supra note 147, at 685; Sprague, supra note 31, at 58; Carlson, supra note 32, at 296.
185. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(l); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3); see Bodie supra note 147, at
685 n.134; see also MICHAELS. HORNE, THOMAS s. WILLIAMSON, JR. & ANTHONY
HERMAN, THE CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: BUSINESS AND LEGAL STRATEGIES § 2.07
(2017) (explaining that some variation of the economic realities test is used to classify
workers under the FLSA, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988).
186. See Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010);
Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999); Loomis Cabinet
Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 20 F.3d 938, 941-42 (9th Cir.
1994).
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vulnerability to discriminatory conduct. This focus requires an analysis of the economic terms of particular relationships on a case-by-case basis, rather than on the basis of a catalogue of immutable factors. The flexibility
of this analysis is essential to avoid the rigidity of the
common law [control] test and to accommodate the present range of employment relationships and the new patterns that may evolve in the future. 187
The "elevation of the control factor to a position of critical importance ... suggests that [the economic realities test] easily could be
oversimplified to an examination of [the control] factor alone, thus
overshadowing the ... effort to suggest a broader framework of analysis. "188 But the lens through which one views control can be different.
Instead of focusing on "personal control," this test can be viewed as
focusing on the hiring entity's control over capital and the project. 189
Scholars have criticized that the economic realities test "captures neither economic reality nor economic dependence." 190 Because
there are so many factors, courts can lose sight of applying them to the
individual relationship:
Instead of becoming the centerpiece of purpose-driven
interpretation under the FLSA, this 'economic reality
of dependence' test has itself degenerated into a disembodied laundry list of factors. Judges, regardless of
whether they wish to include or exclude the workers in

187. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test ofEmployee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARYL. REv. 75, 112-13 (1984).
188. Id at 11 0; see Lee, supra note 139, at 796.
189. Pivateau, supra note 136, at 108; Jane P. Kwak, Note, Employees Versus
Independent Contractors: Why States Should Not Enact Statutes that Target the Construction Industry, 39 J. LEGIS. 295, 297 (2012).
190. Lee, supra note 139, at 779; see Rogers, supra note 142, at 482; Lewis L.
Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realties": The Case for Amending
Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38
B.C. L. REV. 239, 250 (1997). See generally Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent US. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMPAR. LAB. L. & PoL'Y J. 187 (1999).
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question, unimaginatively check off these factors without embedding the test in the act's purpose. 191
Steps were taken in January 2021 to change the test that governs
worker classification for FLSA purposes. The Trump administration's
U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division (DoL) announced
a final rule "clarifying the standard" used for determining worker status.192 While this new rule was withdrawn by the Biden administration
193 The
prior to its effective date, it reflects that change is being sought.
rule's executive summary explained the uncertainty that exists due to
the economic realities test. 194 Through its new regulations, the DoL
endeavored to provide an articulation that would "lead to increased precision and predictability in the economic reality test's application,
which will in turn benefit workers and businesses and encourage innovation and flexibility in the economy." 195
The new regulations changed the economic realities six-factor
test into a five-factor test naming two "core factors": the nature and
degree of the worker's control over the work and the worker's oppor196 The
tunity for profit or loss based on initiative and/or investment.
remaining three factors or "guideposts" are: the amount of skill required for the work; the degree of permanence of the working relationship between the worker and the potential employer; and whether the
work is part of an integrated unit of production. 197 Observing that there
is no "clear principle regarding how to balance the multiple factors" of
the economic realities six-factor test, the new five-factor test required
that the two core factors be allocated greater weight. 198 Additionally,
191. Linder, supra note 190, at 208. See generally GUY DAVIDOV, A
PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LA w 4 (2016) ("[W]e have to restore the connection between labour laws and the goals behind them.").
192. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WAGE AND HOUR DIV., WITHDRAWN RULE: lNDEP.
CONTRACTOR STATUS UNDER THE FAIR LAB. STANDARDS ACT (2021); see 85 Fed.
Reg. 60600 (Sept. 25, 2020) (explaining the Department of Labor's proposed rulemaking notice).
193. SeeU.S.DEP'TOFLAB.,supranote 192.
194. 85 Fed. Reg. 60600, 60600 (Sept. 25, 2020). The current test's "underpinning and the process for its application lack focus and have not always been sufficiently explained by courts or the Department, resulting in uncertainty among the regulated community." Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 60612.
197. Id. at60610,60635.
198. Id. at60609-10.
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the test was to be applied to actual circumstances or practice and not
simply what is contractually or theoretically possible.
The DoL indicated that it had the "modem economy" in mind
with this new structure, noting that certain factors in the old test are not
as applicable to the modem economy 199 and that "continued legal uncertainty may deter innovative work arrangements."200
There were 1,825 comments submitted when DoL solicited
feedback. 201 By example, a call for more clarity for the technology
community came from Dr. James Conrad, President of IEEE-USA,

199. Id. at 60608 (referencing Coase's Theorem on transaction costs when considering the economic realities test integral part factor). When transaction costs of
hiring are high, businesses will hire more employees to perform routine tasks, but
when transaction costs are low, as in the modem (platform) economy, more independent contractors are utilized. Id. This makes the permanence factor irrelevant to the
modem economy. See Ronald Coase, Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937);
see also 85 Fed. Reg. 60600, 60609 (Sept. 25, 2020) (referencing how our shift from
an industrial economy to a knowledge-based economy diminishes the investment factor's relevance and how shorter job tenures diminish the underlying rationale of the
permanence factor because shorter job tenures are the trend); News Release, Bureau
of Lab. Stat., U.S. Dep't of Lab., Employee Tenure in 2014 (Sept. 18, 2014),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/tenure_ 09182014.pdf.
200. 85 Fed. Reg. 60600, 60609 (Sept. 25, 2020); see id. at 60610 (noting that
a clear standard is required so that entrepreneurs will know if what they would like to
do, say, in an app-based business, is going to result in litigation to determine worker
classification).
201. Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document/WHD2020-0007-0001/comment. While there were many comments submitted, at a glance
there are many that are not actual comments on the proposed language, but rather
disclosure as to what the person does to earn money or are simple rants. Id. Unfortunately, these commenters do not understand the purview and scope of the FLSA and
the proposed regulations. This acknowledgement drives the point that workers in the
American economy do not understand our worker classification legal system. This
comment from Kimberly Jenkins provides a telling example:
I am self-employed with a full-time business. I have no children
in my home anymore, so I enjoy the flexibility of driving for UberEats. I am able to drive when I want to, as it fits into my schedule.
The extra income I earn goes toward my future retirement plans. I
appreciate the flexibility of this gig, the opportunity to be of service
to people, and additional income it provides me as a woman in her
mid 50's.

Kimberly Jenkins, Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/WHD-2020-0007-0383.
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stating that "rules that protect technology workers, especially new technology workers, from exploitation need to also allow freelance software engineers, university professors with contracting businesses on
the side, retired aerospace experts, licensed professional engineers, and
technology start-up experts to flourish as legitimate consultants in their
chosen fields." 202 Dr. Conrad was not against the test as presented but
203
Additionally, at least one
noted specific needs for clarification.
to the economic realsimilar
too
"still
is
test
the
that
stated
has
scholar
ities test and has several factors that can complicate enforcement and
application. " 204
As mentioned above, the rule was withdrawn prior to its go-live
date. The reasons given by the Biden administration DoL included: ( 1)
The rule was in tension with the FLSA' s text and purpose, as well as
relevant judicial precedent; (2) The rule's prioritization of two "core
factors" for determining employee status under the FLSA would have
undermined the longstanding balancing approach of the economic realities test and court decisions requiring a review of the totality of the
circumstances related to the employment relationship; and (3) The rule
would have narrowed the facts and considerations comprising the analysis whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor,
205
resulting in workers losing FLSA protections.
While policymakers are considering what to do to modernize
worker classification laws, particularly those meant to classify appbased platform workers properly, knowing about the traditional economic realities test and how Trump's DoL attempted to modify it is
important. As of this writing, the economic realities test is still being
used for FLSA purposes, although President Biden has said that he
202. Letter from Dr. James Conrad, President, Inst. of Elec. & Elec. Eng'r, to
Dep't of Lab., Wage & Hour Div. (Oct. 26, 2020) (on file with author) ("Attempting
to devise a simple rule, or rules, that classify individuals as employees or contractors
neatly is not manageable. Trying to do so will either erroneously classify a good number of successfully [sic] consultants as employees, thereby ending careers prematurely, or require an endless list of exemptions, exceptions, and special rules that will
needlessly complicate and confuse the life of independent contractors and their clients.").
203. Id.
204. Brian A. Brown II, Note, Your Uber Driver Is Here, But Their Benefits Are
Not: The ABC Test, Assembly Bill 5 and Regulating Gig Economy Employers, 15
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 183,206 (2020).
205. 29 C.F.R. §§ 780, 788, 795; see U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR
DIV., supra note 192.
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would like to consider a uniform test for purposes of the FLSA, IRC,
and NLRA. 206 He has been cited as saying that he believes the ABC
test, that is used in various states, should be used at the federal level. 207
The next part discusses the ABC test and other tests that states are using
(that differ from the federal tests). Notably no states have adopted the
Trump's DoL version of the economic realities test.
V. WORKER CLASSIFICATION TESTS AT THE STATE LEVEL
As shown in Part IV, the federal government uses three main
tests to determine worker classification. Because states are not required
to utilize the federal government's tests, many states employ other
tests. This Part outlines state tests that address worker classification
such as the ABC test, and California's modified ABC test formerly
"AB5." It then visits a current trend by a few red states to adopt the
IRS twenty-factor test. 208 Finally, it outlines state laws that directly
address app-based work, such as marketplace contractor laws.
206. The Eiden Plan/or Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions, supra note 24.
207. Id.
208. Notably, it is not only state policymakers that are drafting potential legislation. In May, 2021, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) released
a ''Uniform Worker Classification Act" for consideration by states. UNJF. WORKER
CLASSIFICATION
ACT
(AM.
LEGIS.
EXCH.
COUNCIL
2021),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/unifonn-worker-classification-act. A version of
the uniform act passed in West Virginia as the West Virginia Employment Law
Worker Classification Act and became effective June 9, 2021. Bills have been submitted in numerous states, and the uniform act is gaining some traction in states such
as North Carolina (HB 867), and Oklahoma (SB 380). The overall stated goal of the
uniform act is to "simplifly] the criteria used to define independent contractors with
respect to employment, and impose[] objective standards on the differentiation of independent contractors from employees." UNIF. WORKER CLASSIFICATION ACT, supra.
The model act "also provides for uniformity of a state's laws where the distinction
between employees and independent contractors is relevant." Id. In Section 2(a) of
the act, ALEC makes clear that the act applies to the gig economy. Id.
While ALEC describes itself as "America's largest nonpartisan, voluntary membership organization of state legislators," others have described it as a conservative
nonprofit organization that drafts sample legislation for use by state policymakers.
About ALEC, AM. LEGIS. COUNCIL (2021 ), https://www.alec.org/about. But se,e Maya
Pinto, Rebecca Smith, & Irene Tung, Rights at Risk: Gig Companies' Campaign to
Upend Employment as We Know It, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.nelp.org/publication/rights-at-risk-gig-companies-campaign-to-upendemployment-as-we-know-it/ (referring to ALEC as a "right-wing 'bill mill"'); Nancy
Scola, Exposing ALEC: How Conservative-Backed State Laws Are All Connected,
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A. The ABC Test

The ABC Test (see below) has been trending for the past few
210
It
It is used by numerous states for various determinations.
years.
has been said that "widespread adoption of the ABC test could be a
209

THE ATL. (Apr. 14, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/exposing-alec-how-conservative-backed-state-laws-are-all-connected/255869; Yvonne
Wingett Sanchez & Rob O'Dell, What is ALEC? 'The Most Effective Organization'
for Conservatives, Says Newt Gingrich, USA TODAY (Apr. 3, 2019),
https ://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/04/03/alec-american-legislative-exchange-council-model-bills-repub lican-conservative-devos-gingrich/3162357002 ("ALEC was created in 1973 in Chicago by a small group of conservative activists and state legislators. Their broad goal was to support conservative
ideas and make it easier to disseminate policies that advanced their cause at the state
level.").
209. Maine adopted the ABC test in 1935. Christopher J. Cotnoir, Employees
or Independent Contractors: A Call for Revision of Maine's Unemployment compensation "ABC Test", 46 ME. L. REv. 325 (1994). Massachusetts adopted the test in
2004, and other states have followed. See Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing,
ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor
and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 53, 65 (2015); Prince,
supra note 29. See Part II for a discussion of the coverage of California's 2019 adoption of the ABC test and Part IV.C for a discussion of other states considering adopting
the ABC test now that California has.
210. An analysis of all the states that use the ABC test and for what purposes is beyond the scope of this article. See Jennifer D. Thayer, Amye M. Melton, & David R. Grimmett, Employment Classification in an App-Based Nation,
39 ABA TAX TIMES 4 (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation/publ ications/abataxtimes_ home/20aug/20aug-ppthayer-employment-classificatio n (observing that those that use the ABC test
and those that use a shortened version of the ABC test do not include element
B).
Note that even if the state uses a form of the ABC test, it may not use it for
all purposes, i.e., it may only use it for unemployment compensation purposes.
See 43 PA. STAT.§ 753(1)(2)(B) (2019) for the definition of"employment" for
purposes of being "self-employed" for unemployment compensation in Pennsylvania where the statute only uses two of the elements of the ABC test (A and C).
See also Lowman v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. Rev., 235 A.3d 278, 298 (Pa.
2020).

680

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 52

game changer."211 However, not every state's policymakers are enamored with the ABC test, and some are refuting the use of it. 212
Although a creature of state law, the ABC test has shown signs
of gaining traction at the federal level. In 2020, The Worker Flexibility
and Small Business Protection Act, if passed, would have adopted the
ABC test for purposes of the NLRA, FLSA, OSHA, the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act, the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, the Davis-Bacon Act, and the Walsh-Healy Public Contract Act. 213 The PRO Act would adopt the ABC test for purposes of
the NLRA. 214 The PRO Act passed the House on March 9, 2021, but
it is not likely to pass the Senate "given a lack of Republican support. "215 President Biden's platform materials indicated that he was a
proponent of using the ABC test for various federal statutes. 216
What is it and why all of the interest? The ABC test is said to
"offer[] a relatively more straightforward approach that avoids the totality of the circumstances balancing of the economic realities analysis.
But, unlike the economic realities test, it may result in both over- and

211. Sprague, supra note 44, at 767; see V.B. Dubai, An Uber Ambivalence:
Employee Status, Worker Perspectives, & Regulation in the Gig Economy 5 (Legal
Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 381, 2019), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3488009 (arguing that proposals to the
historical tests often fail to consider "the legally inscribed ability of businesses to reshape their business models and evade employment obligations"). Professor Dubai
notes that the ABC test shifts the focus to enforcement, which challenges the ability
of businesses to escape liability. Id.
212. See infra Part IV.C. Some scholars also have reservations. See Edward
A. Zelinsky, Defining Who is an Employee After A.B.5: Trading Uniformity and Simplicity for Expanded Coverage, 70 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 26-29 (2021) (arguing that the
ABC test is "no model of clarity" and "introduces new interpretative challenges to the
determination of employee status"); Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J.
111, 129 (2009); Sprague, supra note 44, at 767 ("[T]he ABC test is no panacea with
respect to employee/independent contractor classification.").
213. Worker Flexibility and Small Protection Act of 2020, S. 4738, 116th Cong.
§ 102 (2020); H.R. 8375, 116th Cong.§ 102 (2020).
214. See Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2021, S. 420, 117th Cong. §
lOl(b) (2021); H.R. 842, 117th Cong.§ lOl(b) (2021).
215. Don Gonyea, House Democrats Pass Bill that Would Protect Worker Organzzmg
Efforts,
NPR
(Mar.
9,
2021,
9:18
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/09/975259434/house-democrats-pass-bill-that-wouldprotect-worker-organizing-efforts.
216. See The Eiden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions, supra note 24.
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under-inclusiveness." 217 The ABC test from the Massachusetts statute
states:
[A]n individual performing any service ... shall be considered to be an employee unless:
(1) the individual is free from control and direction in
connection with the performance of the service, both under his contract for the performance of service and in
fact; and
(2) the service is performed outside the usual course of
the business of the employer; and,
(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business of the same nature as that involved in the service
performed. 218
As shown, the ABC test presumes employee status unless all
elements of the test are proven to be met by the hiring entity, in which
case the worker will be classified as an independent contractor. Since
the test contains three elements, it is conceivably simpler and should
improve predictability, thereby reducing uncertainty. Undeniably,
there appear to be fewer considerations than the control and economic
realities tests require. And the ABC test is elemental, not factor-based,
so one would think that it would be easier to apply since no weighing
of factors must be done.
In application, the ABC test reclassifies most app-based workers
as employees because it is difficult for typical app-based relationships
to satisfy the second element-the service is performed outside the

217. Goldman & Weil, supra note 158, at 46; Mark Elrich, Misclassification in
Construction: The Original Gig Economy, ILR REV. (2020), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/erlich_ilrr_final_article_ 11.28.20.pdf ("The 'ABC' test codified in California's AB 5 (modeled on a 2004 Massachusetts statute) is the clearest; it
presumes workers to be employees unless they are free from another's direction and
control, perform services outside the employer's usual course of business, and, customarily engage in that trade, occupation, or profession.").
218. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 §148B (West 2009).
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usual course of the business of the employer. 219 For example, in People
v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the California Court of Appeal held that
Uber drivers were employees under California's ABC test because
even though Uber drivers met elements one and three, they failed element two. 220
Further, in Cunningham v. Lyfl, Inc., U.S. District Court Judge
Talwani considered the likelihood that drivers would be "employees"
of Lyft under the ABC test. 221 In proving element two under Massachusetts's ABC test, Lyft had to show that a driver's service "is performed either outside the usual course of the business for which the
service is performed or is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which the service is performed. " 222 Judge
Talwani was not persuaded by Lyft's argument that it "does not provide
transportation services and [that it] is not a transportation carrier."223
"[T]he court fmds a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that,
despite Lyft's careful self-labeling, the realities of Lyft's businesswhere riders pay Lyft for rides-encompasses the transportation of
219. See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Gig-Dependence: Finding the
Real Independent Contractors ofPlatform Work, 39N. ILL. U. L. REv. 379,423 (2019)
(citing Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11,
2018)) (commenting that had Razak been tested under the ABC test, the drivers would
have been considered part ofUber's regular business-element 2-and therefore classified as employees).
220. People v. Uber Techs., Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 266,298 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
as modified on denial of reh'g (Nov. 20, 2020) ("While these details relating to how
drivers are compensated might to a limited extent bear on whether the drivers are free
from Uber's direction and control or whether the drivers are engaged in an independently established trade--prongs A and C of the ABC test-they do not support
Uber's contention that the drivers' work is outside the usual course of its business
1:mder prong B.").
But note that Uber, Lyft, and others were successful with their ballot initiative,
"Prop 22," and now, despite the court rulings, California rideshare app drivers are
independent contractors (or some sort of other category of worker) unless Prop 22 is
ultimately found to be unconstitutional. See Castellanos v. California, No.
RG21088725, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 7285, at *17-18 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 2021).
Judge Roesch ruled that Prop 22 was unconstitutional because it "limits the power of
the future legislature to define app-based drivers as workers subject to workers' compensation law." Id. at 11-12. Uber and others are expected to appeal the ruling, so
the constitutionality of Prop 22 is still being tested.
221. Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D. Mass. 2020).
222. Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., No. l:19-cv-11974, 2020 WL 2616320, at *9
(D. Mass. May 22, 2020) (quoting Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Rev. of the Div. of
Emp't & Training, 786 N.E.2d 365, 371 (Mass. 2003)).
223. Id. at* 10.

2022

The Shoe Is About to Drop

683

riders." 224 As this and other cases move forward, Uber, Lyft, and others
are taking steps to place an initiative on the November, 2022, Massa225
chusetts ballot similar to California's Proposition 22 (Prop 22) that
226
would allow voters to decide their resident drivers' classification.
The ABC test (like the control and economic realities tests) is
designed to catch employers who misclassify workers as independent
contractors. "However, because some workers are legitimately independent contractors or the industries in which they operate cannot function by over-inclusively reclassifying workers" as employees, there are
227
often carve-outs or exemptions to a statute containing the ABC test.
Policymakers considering the adoption of the ABC test with carveouts, therefore, should proceed with caution so that the carve-outs do
not "reflect political will and power rather than a need to re-balance
power in a working relationship." 228 The state that uses the ABC test
and has the most carve-outs is California.

224. Id More tales of woe for Uber and Lyft occurred when the Superior Court
of Massachusetts denied Uber and Lyft's motion to dismiss the claim that their workers are employees, not independent contractors, and that they have been depriving
drivers ofrequired minimum wages, overtime, and sick leave. Healey v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 2084CV01519-BLS1, 2021 WL 1222199 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 2021).
225. See infra Part V.B.
226. See Nate Raymond & Tina Bellon, Group Backed by Uber, Lyfi Pushes
Massachusetts Gig Workers Ballot Measure, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2021, 1:25 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/group-backed-by-uber-lyftpushes-massachusetts-gig-worker-ballot-measure-202 l-08-04 ("The proposal would
establish an earnings floor equal to 120% of the Massachusetts minimum wage for
app-based rideshare and delivery drivers, or $18 an hour in 2023 before tips. Drivers
would be guaranteed at least $0.26 per mile to cover vehicle upkeep and gas."); Spencer Buell, What You Need to Know About the Gig Worker Ballot Question, Bos. MAG.
(Sept. 20, 2021, 5:04 PM), https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2021/09/20/massachusetts-gig-worker-ballot-question (describing the initiative's impact on hotel and
retail workers if employers decide to replace their employees with gig labor. This was
pointed out by Senator Elizabeth Warren.).
227. Prince, supra note 29, at 66; see Jean-Marie Caterina, Commentary: ABC
Exemptions Help Workers, Protect Small Businesses, PRESS HERALD (June 18, 2021).
https://www. pressherald.corn/2021 /06/ l 8/commentary-abc-exemptions-help-workers-protect-small-businesses ("The ABC test cannot tell the difference between a
small-business owner and a worker at risk, but members of Maine's congressional
delegation can. If they conclude that the ABC test is the right way to help workers,
then they should help small businesses like [my real estate business] and others
through California-like exemptions.").
228. Goldman & Weil, supra note 158, at 50; @Thelndypendent, TwtTTER (Jan.
https://twitter.corn/Thelndypendent/staPM),
8:06
2022,
23,
tus/1485433850050273283?s=20 (discussing Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-
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B. California's Modified ABC Test-Formerly "AB5"

test

229

California's worker classification law is comprised of the ABC
and a 1989 court-created multi-factor test (the Borello test). 230

Cortez's remarks regarding New York City's new law providing delivery workers
with access to restrooms, fair pay, and tip transparency).
229. Assem. B. 2257, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (adding Article 1.5 and
repealing LABOR CODE§ 2750.3; effective Sept. 4, 2020); see Prince, supra note 29,
at 85 n.244. When referring to the California worker classification law, most still refer
to it as AB5. This practice continues as we see the San Francisco complaint against
Handy using AB5 as the name of the statute. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil
Penalties, Restitution & Other Equitable Relief at 5, California v. Handy Techs., No.
CGC-21-590442 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/THEPEOPLEOFTHESTA TEOFCALIFORNIA vsHANDYTECHNOLOGIESINCETALDocketNo? 1633976810.
230. The California Department oflndustrial Relations states the Borello multifactor test as "whether the potential employer has all necessary control over the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired, although such control need not be
direct, actually exercised or detailed" and:
1.
Whether the worker performing services holds themselves out as being engaged in an occupation or business distinct
from that of the employer;
2. Whether the work is a regular or integral part of the employer's business;
3. Whether the employer or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place for the worker doing the work;
4. Whether the worker has invested in the business, such as in
the equipment or materials required by their task;
5. Whether the service provided requires a special skill;
6. The kind of occupation, and whether the work is usually
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
7. The worker's opportunity for profit or loss depending on
their managerial skill;
8. The length of time for which the services are to be performed;
9. The degree of permanence of the working relationship;
10. The method of payment, whether by time or by the job;
11. Whether the worker hires their own employees;
12. Whether the employer has a right to fire at will or whether
a termination gives rise to an action for breach of contract; and
13. Whether or not the worker and the potential employer believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship (this
may be relevant, but the legal determination of employment status
is not based on whether the parties believe they have an employeremployee relationship).
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Originally codified as "AB5," the law has been updated (repealed) by
AB2257. 231 California's worker classification law has broad coverage
in that it covers unemployment compensation, workers' compensation,
232
The scope
and the state's minimum wage and overtime protections.
is broader than what most other states use the ABC test for.
California applies the ABC test for some workers and its older
Borello test for others. If workers are exempt (or carved out) from the
ABC test, then they are tested under the Borello test. In other words,
using Borello is a default position used for workers that are exempt
from being tested under the elemental ABC test. "AB5's initial carveouts have been subsequently supplemented by those in AB2257 in an
effort to accommodate workers in several industries. Presently there
are 109 exemptions from the ABC test. 233 Accordingly, AB2257 does
not simplify or clarify a worker's classification but rather creates 'rigid
exemptions' with detailed conditions."234
AB5 reclassified ride-share and delivery app drivers as employees entitling them to a host of protections under the California labor
laws. 235 However, Uber, Lyft, and a select group of other rideshare/delivery companies placed an initiative known as Prop 22 on the California ballot in November 2020. 236 Prop 22 asked residents to vote in
favor of treating "app-based transportation (rideshare) and delivery
Independent Contractor Versus Employee, CAL. DEP'T OF INDUS. RELS.,
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2022); see also S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't oflndus. Reis., 769 P.2d 399,404
(Cal. 1989).
231. See Prince, supra note 29, at 54-55.
232. See Independent Contractor Versus Employee, supra note 230.
233. See Prince, supra note 29, at 67. See id. at 94-96 for the list of exemptions
from AB5 and AB2257. See also Chris Micheli, AB 5 'Fix:' New Exemptions Added
to California's Independent Contractor Law, CAL. GLOBE (Sept. 14, 2020, 2:20 PM),
https://californiaglobe.corn/section-2/ab-5-fix-new-exemptions-added-to-califomiasindependent-contractor-law.
234. Prince, supra note 29, at 67-68; see also Richard Reibstein, AB2257: Not
Much Better Than AB5 for Most Industries in California Using Independent Contractors, JD SUPRA (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ab2257-notmuch-better-than-ab5-for-35040 (discussing the shortcomings of both AB5 and
AB2257, specifically noting key deficiencies in AB2257's exemptions).
235. See, e.g., People v. Uber Techs., Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 266, 298-301 (Cal.
Ct. App.), as modified on denial of reh 'g (2020).
236. California Proposition 22, App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor
Policies Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Califomia_ Proposition_22,_App-Based_Drivers_as_Contractors_and_Labor_Policies_Initiative_(2020)
(last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
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drivers as independent contractors and adopt labor and wage policies
specific to app-based drivers and companies."237 Prop 22 passed, and
if it is upheld by the courts, such drivers will be exempt from California's ABS entirely. 238 As part of Prop 22, Uber and the others set forth
benefits and a minimum wage calculation to apply to its drivers although these were not as generous as what the drivers would receive if
classified as employees under California law. 239 Essentially, Prop 22
established a third category of worker by providing drivers with lesser
benefits than an employee would receive but more than an independent
contractor would receive. 240 While drivers are getting a minimum
hourly wage, the hours are not calculated as favorably and fairly as they
would be if the drivers were classified as "employees." For example,
drivers who come within the purview of Prop 22 will not be paid for
time waiting for work but rather only for time paid executing the task.
According to Professor Dubai's research, "this unpaid time ranges from
40-60% of all the time they spend working. " 241 And what is the demographic of these ride-share and delivery drivers? In our cities it is overwhelmingly immigrants and subordinated minorities. 242 Prop 22 compounds the wealth gap and does little to reduce economic insecurity
and health issues for app-based drivers.

237. Id.
238. Through extensive and expensive lobbying efforts, Uber and other groups
were successful, and Prop 22 received 58.63% of the votes. Id.
239. Id.; see Brian Chen & Laura Padin, Prop 22 Was a Failure for California's
App-Based Workers. Now, It's Also Unconstitutional, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (Sept.
16, 2021), https://www.nelp.org/blog/prop-22-unconstitutional ("[T]he benefits package that the companies offered in exchange proved to be a mirage."); see also Veena
B. Dubai, Economic Security & the Regulation of Gig Work in California: From AB5
to Proposition 22, 13 EUR. LAB. L.J. 51, 56 (2021). Professor Dubai commented on
how the companies-Uber, Lyft, DoorDash, and Instacart-misled voters and drivers.
Id. For example, voters were given information via television and other forms of media indicating that Prop 22 would provide workers with more benefits and guarantee
a minimum wage. Id. However, Prop 22 instead "legally sanctioned the workers'
independent contractor status, stripped workers of protections owed to them by law,
and provided very limited benefits in return." Id.
240. Dubai, supra note 38, at 4. Prop 22 "threatened to take away the employment rights granted to California platform workers and [codified] a third, substandard
category of work for delivery and transportation 'network workers."' Id.
241. Id. at 5 n.11; see, e.g., Dzieza, supra note 11 (describing the perilous situations in which delivery workers find themselves between deliveries and the safety
measures they have taken to protect themselves and each other in New York City).
242. Dubal, supra note 38, at 6.
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Prop 22's constitutionality is working its way through the CaliOn August 20, 2021, the California Superior Court ruled
courts.
fornia
that Prop 22 was unconstitutional because it limited the future legislature's ability to change workers' compensation laws. 243 Uber will appeal the ruling. 244
Prop 22 only exempted rideshare and delivery app drivers from
AB5. It did not exempt other app-based companies, and city District
Attorneys have launched misclassification cases against other appbased companies including DoorDash, Handy, Taskrabbit, Rover, Mobile Wash, Fuzzy Pet Health, and Lime scooters. 245 In the suit against
Handy, the San Francisco District Attorney's complaint alleges that element one of the ABC test cannot be met by Handy. 246 "Through
Handy's omnipresent App and the policies and structure imposed on
Pros by the company, Handy directs and controls the work of its
Pros."247 The complaint outlines more indicia of control including the
requirement to use certain COVID-19 protocols. 248 The complaint also

243. Castellanos v. California, No. RG21088725, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS
7285, at *17-18 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 2021). Judge Roesch ruled that Prop 22 was
unconstitutional because it "limits the power of a future legislature to define app-based
drivers as workers subject to workers' compensation law." Id Uber and others are
expected to appeal the ruling.
244. Preetika Rana, California Ballot Measure that Classifies Uber, Lyft Drivers as Independent Ruled Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2021 ),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proposition-22-is-unconstitutional-california-judgesays-11629512394.
245. On November 22, 2021, DoorDash settled a misclassification case with the
San Francisco Office of Labor Standards and Enforcement for $5,137,953. Press Release, City Att'y, David Chiu, San Francisco Secures Over $5 Million Settlement for
DoorDash Workers (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2021/l l/22/sanfrancisco-secures-over-5-million-settlement-for-doordash-workers.
On August 17, 2020, TaskRabbit settled a pre-AB5 misclassification class action
suit for $1,750,000. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement,
at 2, Finholt v. TaskRabbit Inc., No. BC722869 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2020),
http://www. finholtsettlement.corn/media/2972431/preliminary_ approval_order.pdf;
see also Maeve Allsup, Gig Companies Face California Crackdowns that Uber, Lyft
Escape, DAILY LAB. REP. (Apr. 15, 2021, 3:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw .corn/daily-labor-report/gig-companies-face-california-crackdowns-that-uberlyft-escape.
246. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil Penalties, Restitution & Other Equitable Relief, at 2, 7, California v. Handy Techs., Inc., No. CGC-21-590442, at 2, 7
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2021), https://aboutblaw.corn/Wj0.
247. Id. at 7.
248. Id. at 9. The complaint continues:
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alleges that Handy cannot meet element two of the ABC test because
Pros perform services in the usual course of Handy's business. 249
Lastly, the complaint also alleges that Handy cannot meet element three
of the ABC test because Pros working for Handy are not engaged in
their own independently owned businesses. 250 As of this writing, this
case is pending.
C. The IRS Twenty-Factor Test

While numerous states have adopted (or are considering adopting) the ABC test, some have recently adopted the 1987 IRS twentyfactor test found in Revenue Ruling 87-41 instead. 251 In 2019, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee abandoned the ABC test (or consideration of it) and adopted the IRS twenty-factor test (see below). 252 In
2021, Alabama jumped on the bandwagon and also adopted the IRS
During the current COVID-19 pandemic, Handy has exercised
even further control and monitoring of its Pros. Handy now "require[ s] that Pros wear PPE during bookings" and"[ s]tay home and
rest if they feel sick." Handy also mandates that Pros do "daily
self-certifications," explaining to customers that "[w]e are requiring every pro to confirm that they are not experiencing a fever,
cough, or shortness of breath and committing to following CDC
and local health regulations on a daily basis." And Handy has
turned all "indoor assembly/installations" into "no contact services" whereby Handy requires that Pros follow detailed instructions on how to conduct themselves before, during and after the
job.
Id The complaint then lists detailed directions regarding use of PPE and such
written by Handy. Id at 9-10.
249. Id at 12.
250. Id. at 14.
251. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. Using the twenty-factor test is not new.
Some states have been using it for some time. For example, Michigan started using
the twenty-factor test for unemployment compensation purposes in 2013 having previously used the economic realities test. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.161(n) (2012).
Missouri has been using the twenty-factor test for unemployment tax purposes since
2001. See Klausner v. Brockman, 58 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Mo. App. 2001), overruled
on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo.
2003).
252. H.B. 1850, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ark 2019) (the Arkansas Empower Independent Contractors Act was signed by Governor Asa Hutchinson on April
16, 2019); H.B. 1095, 58th Legs., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2021) (the Oklahoma Empower
Independent Contractors Act was signed by Governor Kevin Stitt on May 13, 2019).
Tennessee's H.B. 539 was signed into law by Governor Bill Lee on May 10, 2019.
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twenty-factor test. 253 Also in 2021, Louisiana adopted a new classification test consisting of a twelve-point list that if seven of the points
are met, the worker will be deemed an independent contractor-it is
easy to see the alignment of these twelve points with the IRS twentyfactor test, but, notably, the statute requires the math to work whereas
the IRS and courts are left to using their own math. 254
253. H.B. 408 was signed by Governor Kay Ivey on April 7, 2021. It became
effective August 1, 2021. H.B. 408 does not apply for workers' compensation purposes.
254. H.B. 705, 2021 Reg. Sess. (La. 2021) was signed by Governor John Bel
Edwards on June 23, 2021, and became effective on August 1, 2021. Workers who
pass at least 7 of the 12 points are classified as independent contractors. The twelve
points are:
(a) The individual or entity operates an independent business
that provides services for or in connection with the contracting
party.
(b) The individual or entity represents the provided services as
self-employment available to others, including through the use of
a platform application to obtain work opportunities or as a lead
generation service.
(c) The individual or entity accepts responsibility for all tax liability associated with payments received from or through the contracting party.
(d) The individual or entity is responsible for obtaining and
maintaining any required registration, licenses, or other authorization necessary for the legal performance of the services rendered
by him as the contractor.
(e) The individual or entity is not insured under the contracting
party's health insurance or workers' compensation insurance coverage and is not covered for unemployment insurance benefits.
(f) The individual or entity has the right to accept or decline
requests for services by or through the contracting party and is able
to perform services for or through other parties or can accept work
from and perform work for other businesses and individuals besides the contracting party even if the individual voluntarily
chooses not to exercise this right or is temporarily restricted from
doing so.
(g) The contracting party does not direct or oversee the performance, methods, or processes the individual or entity uses to perform services.
(h) The contracting party has the right to impose quality standards or a deadline for completion of services performed, or both,
but the individual or entity determines the days worked and the
time periods of work.
(i) The individual or entity furnishes the major tools or items
of equipment needed to perform the work.
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Interestingly, in 2020, the Commonwealth of Virginia's legislature was presented with a choice: adopt the ABC test or the IRS
twenty-factor test. 255 After considering both, it chose to adopt the
twenty-factor test. 256
In the summer of 2021, West Virginia passed the West Virginia
Employment Law Worker Classification Act that outlines a safe-harbor
for classifying a worker as an independent contractor. 257 If the safeharbor is not met, the IRS twenty-factor test applies before deciding
whether a person should be classified as an employee. 258 In other
words, failing to meet the safe-harbor does not automatically classify
the worker as an employee. The hiring entity has another opportunity
to show the worker is truly an independent contractor through application of the twenty-factor test.
The twenty factors as outlined in Revenue Ruling 87-41 consider:
1. Instructions
2. Train4Ig
3. Integration
4. Services Rendered Personally
5. Hiring, Supervising, and Paying Assistants
G) The individual or entity is paid a fixed or contract rate for
the work performed and the contracting party does not pay the individual or entity a salary or wages based on an hourly rate.
(k) The individual or entity is responsible for the majority of
expenses incurred in performing the services, unless the expenses
are reimbursed under an express provision of a written contract between the parties or the expenses reimbursed are commonly reimbursed under industry practice.
(1) The individual or entity can use assistants as deemed proper
for the performance of the work and is directly responsible for supervision and compensation.

Id. .
255. H.B. 801, Gen. Assemb., 2020 Sess. (Va. 2020), which would have
adopted the ABC test, but instead enacted H.B. 1407 Gen. Assemb., 2020 Sess. (Va.
2020), which requires use of the twenty-factor test.
256. H.B. 1407, Gen. Assemb., 2020 Sess. (Va. 2020), was signed by Governor
Ralph Northam on April 6, 2020. It became effective on July 1, 2020.
257. H.B. 2590, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2021); Todd Lebowitz, West
Virginia Adopts Pro-Business Independent Contractor Test, WHO Is MY EMP.? (Mar.
29, 2021 ), https://whoismyemployee.com/2021/03/29/west-virginia-adopts-pro-business-independent-contractor-test; see also supra note 208.
258. Lebowitz, supra note 257.
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6. Continuing Relationship
7. Set Hours of Work
8. Full Time Required
9. Doing Work on Employer's Premises
10. Order or Sequence Set
11. Oral or Written Reports
12. Payment by Hour, Week, Month
13. Payment of Business and/or Traveling
14. Furnishing of Tools and Materials
15. Significant Investment
16. Realization of Profit or Loss
17. Working for More than One Firm at a Time
18. Making Service Available to General Public
19. Right to Discharge
20. Right to Terminate259
No one single factor is dispositive; hiring entities (and courts) are to
260
consider all of the factors and the relationship as a whole.
It is likely that business-friendly states are adopting the IRS test
because their resident business owners are often most immediately concerned with the economics of taxation-paying half of a worker's social security and Medicare taxes and being subject to withholding. Ensuring alignment with the IRS by using its test saves the business
owners money while providing the added security in the knowledge
that they are less likely to violate tax laws and receive deficiency notices. 261
While Tennessee has adopted the use of the twenty-factor test,
it does not use it for purposes of app-based companies. Tennessee,

259. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
(2022),
21453T
No.
Cat.
15-A,
Publication
260. I.RS.
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p l 5a.pdf.
261. Additionally, now tax attorneys can employ machine-learning tools that
perform scenario testing and sensitivity analysis based on federal tax worker classification cases from 1921 to 2021, which can enable tax attorneys to estimate the relevance of each of the IRS factors based on their client's specific fact pattern. I have no
evidence that policymakers knew about this artificial intelligence, but as it becomes
more well-known it could influence policymakers to choose the IRS test instead of
one of the other options. Benjamin Alarie & Kathrin Gardhouse, Predicting Worker
Classification in the Gig Economy, TAX NOTES (Dec. 20, 2021),
https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-analysis/predicting-worker-classification-gigeconomy/202 l/l2/l 7/7cpkf.
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instead, adopted a "marketplace contractor" law to address app-based
workers directly.

D. Addressing the Gig Economy Head-on: Marketplace Contractor
Laws
A handful of states (mostly red voting states) have adopted appbased worker classification laws or administrative rules that specifically address the classification of marketplace platform workers. 262
These laws typically use the term "marketplace contractor" when addressing the app-based worker. Of note, these. laws do not create a
functionally different classification like the United Kingdom's limb (b)
worker or Prop 22's other "category," but instead clarify that workers
who fit within these statutes will be classified as independent contractors.
The marketplace contractor laws were initially authored by
Handy, Inc., an app-based company that matches workers with customers who need to hire a cleaning or handy person. 263 Although Handy
initially engaged in unsuccessful lobbying efforts in California, Colorado, Alabama and Georgia, it ultimately focused its lobbying efforts
on "mostly-Republican states" seeing these states as ones where there
was a greater potential for success. 264 Handy's political strategist and
lobbyist, Bradley Tusk, has been quoted as saying: "If starting with the
harder states failed, we're taking a shot at something's [sic] that a little
faster .... What is ultimately a better business decision? To try to
262. See infra Table 1.
263. The marketplace contractor laws are often referred to as "Handy laws."
See Sarah Kessler, Handy is Quietly Lobbying State Lawmakers to Declare Its Workers Aren't Employees, QUARTZ AT WORK, https://work.qz.com/1240997/handy-is-trying-to-change-labor-law-in-eight-states (last updated Apr. 2, 2018); Norman
Scheiber, Is Gig Work a Job? Uber and Others Are Maneuvering to Shape the Answer,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/business/economy/gig-economy-lobbying.html; Justin Miller, Handy Wanted to Disrupt Texas Labor Laws. It May Have Also Disrupted Texas Lobbying Laws, TEX. OBSERVER (Apr.
3, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/handy-wanted-to-disrupt-texas-labor-laws-it-may-have-also-disrupted-texas-lobbying-laws.
264. Lydia DePillis, For Gig Economy Workers in These States, Rights Are at
Risk, CNN MONEY (Mar. 14, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/14/news/economy/handy-gig-economy-workers/index.html (noting that California, Colorado, Alabama, and Georgia declined to adopt the Handy laws). Handy seems to have foreseen
the potential misclassification issue in California and now finds itself in a lawsuit
brought by the San Francisco District Attorney's office. See infra Part V.B.
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change the law in a way that you think works for your platform, or to
make sure your platform fits into the existing law?"265
Table 1 lists the states that have marketplace contractor statutes
together with their statutory citations.

Table 1. Marketplace Contractor Statutes by State
State

Marketplace Contractor Statute

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 23-1603
Arizona
Fla. Stat. § 451.02
Florida
Ind. Code§ 22-1-6-3
Indiana
Iowa Code § 93 .2
Iowa
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 336.137
Kentucky
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-8-102
Tennessee
Utah Code Ann. & 34-53-201 *
Utah
*limited to building service contractors

The stated motivation behind the marketplace contractor laws is
to provide consistency and reduce uncertainty, however, these laws
have been criticized by many scholars and organizations because by
codifying "independent contractor" status for platform companies, appbased workers are precluded from employment-related protections
such as workers' compensation. 266 The laws are also self-serving because companies make more money if their workers are independent
contractors. App-based companies thus do not want to absorb the costs
or risks of having employees thereby giving them a competitive edge
against companies that do classify workers as employees. 267
265. DePillis, supra note 264.
266. Duff, supra note 140. Aside from the obvious reasons that this is problematic, it is exacerbated when one considers that "on-demand jobs are among the
most dangerous in the nation, with most work focused on transportation, delivery, and
home services .... " David B. Torrey, Workers' Compensation, Nonstandard Work,
and Workers Laboring in the Gig, 49 THE BRIEF (July 8, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_ trial_insurance_practice/publications/the_brief/201920/spring/workers-compensation-nonstandard-work-and-workers-laboring-the-gig/.
267. Keeping costs down puts these companies at a competitive advantage. For
example, in the complaint brought by San Francisco District Attorney (DA) against
Handy, the DA avers that in misclassifying the workers, Handy does not contribute to
the social safety net like the workers' compensation fund or the unemployment trust
fund and therefore it violates California's unfair competition law. Additionally, the
complaint states:
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1. Tennessee
Marketplace contractor statutes are all similar since Handy authored them. As such, looking at one is representative of the others.
Tennessee's statute states:
A marketplace contractor is an independent contractor ..
. for all purposes under state and local laws . . . if the
following conditions are set forth in a written agreement
between the marketplace platform and the marketplace
contractor:
( 1) The marketplace platform and marketplace contractor
agree in writing that the contractor is an independent contractor with respect to the marketplace platform;
(2) The marketplace platform does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours during which the marketplace contractor must be available to accept service requests from
third-party individuals or entities. If a marketplace contractor posts the contractor's voluntary availability to
provide services, the posting does not constitute a prescription of hours for purposes of this subdivision (a)(2);
(3) The marketplace platform does not prohibit the marketplace contractor from using any online-enabled application, software, website, or system offered by other
marketplace platforms;
(4) The marketplace contractor may, at its discretion, enlist the help of an assistant to complete the services, and
the marketplace platform may require the assistant to
complete the marketplace platform's standard registration and vetting process. If the marketplace contractor

The illegal employment practices of Handy further harm responsible businesses that comply with State and local laws because
misclassification skews the market and allows companies like
Handy to reap the benefits of, inter alia, artificially low labor costs,
which can drive competitors out of business or prevent new businesses from ever entering the market.
Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil Penalties, Restitution & Other Equitable
Relief, at 2, 7, California v. Handy Techs., Inc., No. CGC-21-590442, at 2, 7 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2021), https://aboutblaw.com/Wj0.
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enlists the help of an assistant, the marketplace contractor, not the marketplace platform, is responsible for paying the assistant;
(5) The marketplace platform does not restrict the marketplace contractor from engaging in any other occupation or business;
(6) The marketplace platform does not require marketplace contractors to use specific supplies or equipment;
(7) The marketplace platform does not control the means
and methods for the services performed by a marketplace
contractor by requiring the marketplace contractor to follow specified instructions governing how to perform the
services. However, the marketplace platform may require that the quality of the services provided by the marketplace contractor meets specific standards and requirements;
(8) The agreement or contract between the marketplace
contractor and the marketplace platform may be terminated by either the marketplace contractor or the marketplace platform with or without cause;
(9) The marketplace platform provides no medical or
other insurance benefits to the marketplace contractor,
and the marketplace contractor is responsible for paying
taxes on all income derived as a result of services performed to third parties from the assignments or connections received from the marketplace platform; and
(10) All, or substantially all, payment to the marketplace
contractor is based on performance of services to third
parties who have engaged the services of the marketplace
contractor through the marketplace platform. 268
This law is a perfect example of how Handy authored a statute
that "simply restates the elements of the current business models of the
gig companies. The 'test' is said to be rigged so that gig companies
will always earn a passing grade and an exemption from labor standards

268.

TENN. CODE

ANN.§ 50-8-102 (2021).
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governing the employer-employee relationship."269 Marketplace contractor laws, moreover, have been said to place downward pressure on
labor standards while incentivizing businesses to incorporate online labor platform technology in order to have a legal basis for classifying
workers as independent contractors. 270
Handy laws attempt to put distance between the marketplace
platform hiring entity and the worker to avoid a "control" issue. In fact,
in looking at the Tennessee statute above, one can see how it delicately
dances around the control factor provided by other tests by outlining
specific ways it is not controlling the workers.
The Tennessee marketplace contractor statute contains an exemption for ride-sharing platforms like Uber and Lyft. 271 These companies are "transportation network companies" and are addressed under a different provision in the Tennessee Code. 272 Tennessee workers
who do not come within the purview of the marketplace contractor laws
previously were tested under the ABC test, however, as noted in Part
V.C. effective January 1, 2020, Tennessee abandoned the ABC test in
favor of the IRS twenty-factor test from Rev. Rul. 87-41. 273
2. Texas
The Texas Workforce Commission (the agency that handles unemployment related matters such as unemployment insurance and taxation) passed an app-based worker/marketplace contractor rule that became effective on April 29, 2019. 274 Texas Administrative Code
Section 815 .134, "Employment Status: Employee or Independent Contractor," is limited to determining a marketplace contractor's "employment status" for purposes of unemployment compensation and associated withholding taxes provided in Title 4, Subtitle A of the Texas
Labor Code. 275 The Texas Workforce Commission also adopted the
following language:

NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT, RIGHTS AT RISK: GIG COMPANIES' CAMPAIGN TO
EMPLOYMENT AS WE KNow IT 3 (2019), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Rights-at-Risk-4-2-19.pdf.
270. Id.; see Goldman & Weil, supra note 158, at 48.
271. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 50-8-103 (2021).
272. TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 65-15-301 to -311 (2021).
273. See supra Part III.C.
274. 40 TEX. AoMIN. CODE§ 815.134 (2021).
275. Id.
269.
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The employment status analysis is generally predicated
on determining whether direction and control could exist
in fact or in contract. Because marketplace platforms'
business models are becoming increasingly prevalent in
our economy, clarification, through rule, of how direction and control apply in these instances is needed as it
applies to unemployment insurance. 276
The rule contains nine elements that define a "marketplace contractor," and if all nine are met, then the worker will not be considered
"in employment" of the "marketplace platform."277 Said another way,
the rule presumes employment unless all of the nine elements are met.
The elements must be met in contract and in fact before a worker is not
treated as in employment. The nine elements are:
(A) That all or substantially all of the payment paid to the
contractor shall be on a per-job or transaction basis;
(B) The marketplace platform does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours during which the marketplace contractor must be available to accept service requests from
the public (including third-party individuals or entities)
submitted through the marketplace platform's digital network;

276. 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 815.134 (2018) {amended Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.twc.texas.gov/files/agency/fr-ch-8 l 5-marketplace-adopted-4-9- l 9twc.pdf. The stated purpose of the rule is to "develop an employment status analysis
for workers who use a marketplace platform's digital network to conduct their own
independent businesses." Id.
277. 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE§ 815.134(b){l)(C)(2) (2021). "Marketplace platform" is defined as an entity operating in Texas that:
{i) uses a digital network to connect marketplace contractors to
the public (including third-party individuals and entities) seeking
the type of service or services offered by the marketplace contractors; (ii) accepts service requests from the public (including thirdparty individuals and entities) only through its digital network, and
does not accept service requests by telephone, by facsimile, or in
person at physical retail locations; and
(iii) does not perform the services offered by the marketplace
contractor at or from a physical business location that is operated
by the platform in the state.
Id. at§ 815.134(b)(l)(B).
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(C) The marketplace platform does not prohibit the marketplace contractor from using a digital network offered
by any other marketplace platform;
(D) The marketplace platform does not restrict the contractor from engaging in any other occupation or business;
(E) The marketplace contractor is free from control by
the marketplace platform as to where and when the marketplace contractor works and when the marketplace
contractor accesses the marketplace platform's digital
network;
(F) The marketplace contractor bears all or substantially
all of the contractor's own expenses that are incurred by
the contractor in performing the service or services;
(G) The marketplace contractor is responsible for providing the necessary tools, materials, and equipment to perform the service or services;
(H) The marketplace platform does not control the details
or methods for the services performed by a marketplace
contractor by requiring the marketplace contractor to follow specified instructions governing how to perform the
services; and
(I) The marketplace platform does not require the contractor to attend mandatory meetings or mandatory training_ 21s
The above elements will be applied on a case-by-case basis
based upon the facts of each working relationship. 279 Clearly, when
reviewing the elements (like those of the Tennessee statute), one can
see that most, if not all, app-based relationships will meet these

278. Id at§ (b)(l)(C)(2).
279. See 40 Tox. ADMIN. CODE § 815.134 (2018) (amended Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.twc.texas.gov/files/agency/fr-ch-8 I 5-marketplace-adopted-4-9-19twc. pdf ("These rules will provide for a robust consideration of all facts and circumstances applicable to the marketplace platform/contractor working relationship and
help ensure a consistent approach while preserving a case-by-case analysis on the precise aspects present in a particular case. Whether an individual's performance of the
service has been and will continue to be free from control or direction under the contract and in fact under§ 815.134(b) will be determined by TWC based upon the unique
facts of each relationship.").
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elements, and therefore, workers will be independent contractors entitled to no protections.

***
Table 2 compares the Texas rule and the Tennessee statute. This
comparison shows that the Texas rule has more elements that must be
met and is not geared primarily to an app-based company that is similar
to, or actually, Handy. 280 But overall, the result is likely the same under
both tests-app-based workers will be classified as independent contractors.

Table 2. Comparison of Texas and Tennessee's Marketplace Contractor
Laws
Element
Per-job or transaction compensation
No prescribed hours
Workers can use other platforms
Workers can engage in other occupations or businesses
Worker bears substantially all of
their own expenses in providing the
services
Worker supplies own tools, materials, and equipment
Platform does not require workers
to use specific supplies or equipment
Platform does not control the details or methods by requiring specified instructions
No mandatory meetings or training
Independent Contractor Agreement
in place

Texas
Yes

Tennessee
No

Yes (B) and (E)
Yes (C)
Yes (D)

Yes (2)
Yes (3)
Yes (4)

Yes (F)

No

Yes (G)

No

No

Yes (5)

Yes (H)

Yes (6) with different wording

Yes (I)
No

No
Yes (1)

280. Other marketplace contractor statutes are nearly identical to Tennessee's
statute. Thus, the comparison between Texas and Tennessee is really a comparison
between Texas and all other marketplace contractor statutes.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The shoe is about to drop in the United States and in some places
around the globe it has already done so. President Biden seeks to
change and unify the federal law applicable to worker classification in
an effort to fairly protect workers, while app-based companies seek
ways around these efforts. These companies have already shown that
they intend to do things their own way-fighting in court and arbitrations or creating a new classification of worker and providing those
workers with only those benefits they choose to provide. They are also
spending a lot of time and money on lobbying to get laws passed that
accommodate their business model and preserve independent contractor status for workers.
Worldwide governments and courts are seeking clarity as well.
Spain has already addressed app-based drivers' classification head-on
and has enacted legislation classifying them as employees. 281 The EU
Commission released its proposed directive on app-based workers for
the EU Parliament and Council's consideration. 282 And it seems like
every month another app-based worker classification court case is decided somewhere in the world.
It has been proposed by many that we need a third category of
worker that could apply to app-based workers. 283 The UK has limb (b)
workers that receive certain benefits, benefits less than an employee

281. See supra Part III.B.
282. See supra Part III.A.
283. Harris, supra note 33, at 8; John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The
Future of Independent Contractors and Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on
from a Common Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS Bus. L.J., 1, 31-34 (2018) ("A threecategory legal framework could be beneficial because it would recognize and account
for a large and growing number of worker-employer relationships that exist in the
modem economy, such as conflicts involving gig-economy workers who are hard to
classify under the current binary system."); Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for the Gig Economy, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 443,
480-81 (2018) (arguing that the term "dependent contractor" is inapt because many
Gig workers are not dependent on their work platforms, and proposing that the third
category be called "independent employee" instead of "dependent contractor"). But
see Tippett, supra note 152 (discussing regulatory approaches to protect workers in
the sharing economy, including a possible approach that extends coverage of existing
employment protections to all workers, regardless of their worker classification). Professor Tippet advocates for necessary adjustments to court and regulatory approaches
to ensure a "baseline level of protections to affected workers." Id.
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284 Prop 22 crewould have but more than an independent contractor.
285 The
ated a third category of worker (for specific app-based drivers).
Prop 22 third category of worker "lowers the baseline employment
standards" because workers are getting less than they would if they
286 The Prop 22 category also perpetuates
were treated as employees.
racial inequalities. 287 IfU.S. policymakers are interested in creating an
intermediate or additional category of worker, they need to ensure that
the benefits/protection s required under such a category do not further
perpetuate worker inequities including racial and gender inequalities.288
One thing is for sure, the volume of legal disputes over the issue
of app-based worker classification is unsustainable and puts tremendous pressure on workers who must hire attorneys or enter lengthy administrative processes to establish their rights. Each day app-based
workers are being denied rights they should be entitled to and as such
are not only living with existential and economic instability but also
experiencing increased health risks. It is important that we protect such
284. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. Italy and Canada also use
a third category of worker. See Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, "Dependent
Contractors" in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REv. 635
(2017); Can. Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, L-2, § 3 (defining a dependent contractor as
a person who "whether or not employed under a contract of employment, performs
work or services for another person on such terms and conditions that they are, in
relation to that other person, in a position of economic dependence on, and under an
obligation to perform duties for, that other person"); see also Harris, supra note 33, at
8; Pearce II & Silva, supra note 283, at 31; Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker, & Leah Yosko,
Employee or Independent Contractor? Charting the Legal Significance ofthe Distinction in Canada, IO CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 193, 198-201 (2003).
Professors Fudge, Tucker, and Yosko studied four Canadian jurisdictions and
noted that there are "wide variations in the personal scope of coverage of the common
and civil law of employment, collective bargaining, employment standards, human
rights and workers' compensation legislation, as well as social wage and income tax
legislation." Id. There is no country-wide universal solution, and the definition of
employee versus dependent contractor can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See
id.
285. See supra Part II; Dubai, supra note 38, at 9-10.
286. Dubai, supra note 38, at 10.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 45 ("The lowering of wage and benefits regulations for workers at
the margins of the labor market through a third category-whether that category reflects the specific terms of Prop 22 or is framed more benevolently through legislation
or a private business-labor compromise-will necessarily entrench racialized hierarchies and be understood historically as a form of abandonment of dispossessed workers.").
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workers and take the guesswork out of this point of classification. This
article provides an up-to-date review of the tests being used at various
levels in the United States as well as movements in other countries with
a goal toward providing more information for policymakers.
It is urgent that governments move swiftly and smartly to solve
not only the economic issues associated with app-based work but also
the public health issues created by stress, psychological distress, and
physical ailments brought on by unregulated app-based work. Let's
go.

